"Gotta Get the Go-Fast"
(See R. Watts, pp. 84-87, September 1999 Proceedings)
Charles M. Fuss, Jr., author of Sea of Grass (Naval Institute Press, 1996)—Lieutenant Commander Watts notes that maritime smuggling has changed significantly in a short time. He characterizes the early days as involving "random, slow, and easy to catch bulk shipments of marijuana." That is only part of the story. We have met the go-fasts once before and defeated them.
I have some knowledge of what worked against these smugglers in the past based on interviews with indicted and/or convicted major drug smugglers as part of my duties with the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS). I also prepared the maritime smuggling scenarios for the 1988 drug interdiction games at the Naval War College. NNBIS, established in 1983, was the first major attempt at a joint counternarcotics effort. It brought the military and the intelligence community into the drug war.
In 1982, cocaine smugglers began to develop methods of air dropping their commodity to fast boats in the Bahamas for delivery to south Florida. By 1985, cocaine go-fasts were assaulting south Florida daily, frequently running a clean boat ahead of the load boat as a decoy. These maritime smuggling operations were essentially shut down by joint tactical enforcement using Coast Guard, Customs, Drug Enforcement Agency, Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps assets coordinated by the NNBIS Center in Miami. Mobile and fixed aerostats for real-time intelligence on fast-- moving targets were important to the task. By 1990, the cocaine go-fasts were gone. In that year, intelligence sources estimated that 70% of the cocaine entering the United States came across our land border with Mexico.
Proponents of a Joint Tactical Law Enforcement Command should address the "how" of acquiring usable intelligence from the intelligence community and the civilian law enforcement agencies. One direct method of providing intelligence in relatively small operating areas would be to recall a single mobile aerostat platform (MAP) vessel. In 1984, the Coast Guard developed maritime interdiction surveillance teams and a target information system for deployment aboard MAP vessels. It worked very well at a modest cost when compared to other highly technical intelligence platforms that are hard to schedule. The floating aerostats were decommissioned in 1992.
"Parting with the Prowler"
(See L. Bonzo, pp. 36-38, August 1999; B. Hussey, p. 12, September 1999 Proceedings)
Captain Thomas Hofer, U.S. Marine Corps, EA-6B Developmental Test Project Officer, Naval Strike Aircraft Test Squadron—I disagree wholeheartedly with Captain Bonzo's suggestion that the Marine Corps give up its Prowlers to the Navy. I believe it is time that the Marine Corps take back operational control of the Prowlers and return them to the business of supporting Marines. The purpose of Marine Aviation is to support the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) and the purpose of Marine Prowlers is to provide electronic warfare (EW) support to the MAGTF commander. I will be the first to admit that the Prowler community has become separated from the MAGTF. Captain Bonzo is correct when he writes that most Prowler aircrew have a limited knowledge of MAGTF doctrine and that the EW capability of the Prowler has become a foreign quantity to the rest of the Marine Corps.
My WestPac deployment as part of Marine Aircraft Group-12 (MAG-12) gave me a good insight into why the Marines need EA-6Bs. The mission of MAG-12 in WestPac is to fight the opening days of any new potential conflict on the Korean Peninsula. It will be Marine aircraft from MAG-12, including EA6Bs, that keep the North Korean threat contained until they can be joined by the Navy carrier-based and Air Force landbased aircraft. In this scenario, there will be no time to wait for a "purple squadron" to arrive on the scene. By that time we will be fighting a defensive war. In addition, the support of the "purple squadrons" will have to be requested by the Pacific's commander-in-chief (CinC) and weighed against other operations currently taking place in the world. I have no doubt that the CinC would get the requested support, but getting it will take time that may not be available.
What is my solution? The Marine Corps should keep its four tactical electronic warfare squadrons (VMAQs) with five planes each. There always will be one squadron on deployment to Iwakuni, Japan, in support of MAG-12. One squadron will be in an active training work-up period, preparing for deployment to Iwakuni. This squadron should be fully manned and participating in combined-- arms exercises, Green Flag/Red Flag exercises, Scorpion Wind, Hornet's Nest, and Weapons and Tactics Instructor courses. The emphasis during this training period should be on supporting and operating with Marines whenever possible. A particular emphasis should be placed on integrating with the assets located on the West Coast that have little interaction with EA-6Bs. One squadron will be on standby to support whichever real-world contingencies arise. This squadron will be ready to deploy on a 96hour notice but will be free to conduct training flights from its home base of Cherry Point. The fourth squadron will be in a recovery period after returning from their deployment to WestPac. The recovery period will be a chance for the Marines to accomplish their required Marine "green" training (rifle range, pistol range, etc.), give the squadron a chance to transfer and accept aircraft, and provide a time for Marines to use their much-deserved leave.
The squadron rotation will go like this: stand the 96-hour deployment alert duty for six months while training at home; devote six months to training as a workup for the upcoming deployment; deploy to Iwakuni as part of MAG-12 for six months; return home for the six-month recovery period. The commitment to support the Marines in WestPac will be filled by Marines at all times. Integration into Marine training exercises will improve the knowledge of Prowler aircrews in MAGTF doctrine while improving the awareness of the Prowler's capabilities. The Prowlers still will be available for joint contingency operations, and allowing Marines to spend more time at home will result in improved morale.
The Marine Corps will have to devote itself to keeping the VMAQ squadrons manned at a high level, and additional funding will be required to support training and deployment operations. The Marine general officers will have to fend off the constant requests for Prowlers to support every joint contingency need that arises. Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff must use the Prowlers, both Navy and Marine, wisely and sparingly, much in the same way the F-117 and B-2 are used. Send the Prowlers to the fight, use them, then get them home and ready for the next fight.
Captain Bonzo states that providing a national asset is a tall order and I agree completely. The national asset that the Marine Corps provides, however, should be a fully integrated MAGTF with EA6B support. The Marine Corps is the nation's 9-1-1 force to national threats and should be used in that manner, not as a strategic asset.