"In Search of the Zero-Defects Monster"
(See B. Hamblet, p. 48-49, October 2001 Proceedings)
Midshipman P R. Buryk, U.S. Navy—I found Lieutenant Commander Hamblet's article reassuring. As a future junior officer, I will be tasked with making controversial decisions that may have the potential to tarnish or end my career. I trust that the Naval Academy is preparing me to make those decisions by allowing me to make mistakes while in training.
Often, new midshipmen arrive for their indoctrination with no prior knowledge or understanding of military life, its customs, and its traditions. It is the duty of upper-class midshipmen and the Naval Academy staff to teach these newcomers the rules of the road. I have seen the early stages of plebe training as both plebe and upper-class detailer. I have observed steps being taken to rid the Naval Academy of the zero-defect mentality. For example, the standing policy with my squad this past Plebe Summer tolerated first mistakes. Repeated mistakes warranted progressively harsher punishment, however. My squad responded very well to this leadership philosophy. Their focus became learning and teamwork rather than the avoidance of mistakes for fear of punishment. This is one example of the absence, or subdued presence, of the zero-defect mentality I have observed.
Midshipmen are by no means perfect, and we will make mistakes. Those appointed over us must consider this maxim when assigning punishment for first mistakes or minor rule infractions. The Naval Academy is a leadership laboratory in which future officers should be able to experiment with different leadership styles and even slip up from time to time. We should learn from our mistakes, thus building character and confidence. I believe that the Naval Academy and the naval service should bolster the idea that making mistakes is acceptable provided that no serious harm is caused, a lesson is learned, and the same mistake is not committed again. Not only does this attitude foster a more cohesive and professional atmosphere, but it also promotes creativity and initiative.
It is encouraging to know that there are those in the fleet who have joined the crusade to slay the zero-defects monster. There is no doubt that tolerant mentorship is essential in the development of future junior officers.
Captain William B. Hayler U.S. Navy (Retired)—This article is one of the more refreshing contributions to Proceedings that I have read in years. It helps give us old fuds faith in the present-day Navy. Certainly mistakes are to be expected, and it is comforting to know that some younger officers realize that their elders (if not betters) view them in perspective.
A long-ago lecture at the Naval War College may be relevant. In 1954, when Arleigh Burke was Commander, Destroyer Force, Atlantic Fleet, he spoke to the junior class. Most of us were lieutenant commanders or commanders, and many had had commands. Someone asked how he viewed mistakes. His answer was fast: "The first is okay. On the second, they go!"
"Base Evaluations on Professional Performance"
(See J. Nowak, p. 94, October 2001 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Tracy G. DeWitt, U.S. Navy—Lieutenant Nowak's article merely showed that he does not support wardroom functions. If he truly is concerned about building relationships outside his community, he needs to deploy on a carrier. There he will be exposed to other communities.
It was disturbing to read shallow views on the ability of commanding officers to write fair and objective fitness reports. The only roadblock described was his shortsightedness in thinking that many junior officers play the "FitRep 500" game. That is not true. An officer is held to a higher set of standards than the average sailor. Fitness reports do not reflect an officer's social stature or even the command's social scene.
A wardroom's members must get along with each other no matter their rank. If there are wardroom functions a member can't attend, then the officer has a responsibility to tell the commanding officer. If there is a pattern of not attending these functions, then members must take a long look in the mirror and examine their priorities.
Lieutenant Nowak is missing the big picture of what it takes to be a naval officer. Performance is the foremost element, whether it is as a pilot, surface warfare officer, or submariner. But he forgot to mention supporting the command.
Lieutenant Nowak needs to work toward becoming a team player. By participating in command functions, he would be setting an example for subordinates and showing that the command is a good place to work. He also would show that he is concerned about his actions.
Commander Thomas Schwarz, U.S. Navy—It is a shame that Lieutenant Nowak obviously has had a bad experience in his career and his negative attitude is probably why "nobody asked him." I have attended numerous "mandatory fun" functions as a junior officer and "persuaded" junior officers to attend some as an executive officer. I either complained under my breath or heard others around me when one of these functions happened. However, almost to a person, everyone had a good time once they got there. There were a few I admit that were not as good as they could have been, but only a few. I usually met people I would not have had a chance to converse with, such as senators, dignitaries, and Medal of Honor winners.
I also would not have seen extraordinary homes in the hills of St. Thomas or the top of a hotel in Hong Kong overlooking the harbor. Young sailors sometimes need encouragement to have fun; also it builds their social skills. Wardroom functions are opportunities for officers to get together outside of work, which most often keeps them too busy to just chat. It also is a chance for spouses to meet and catch up on news.
The junior officers talk about leaving early and end up being the ones I have to kick out of my house. In no command I have served in or heard of has any fitness report or ranking been influenced by the ability of the officer to socialize.
The second issue in his article is demeaning to wives' or spouses' organizations. The thought that they are only formed so some spouses can improve their husbands' rankings is ridiculous. Many of these groups get together to converse with adults after spending most of their time with kids. It's a way to get out of the house and spend time with peers. It is also a way to find company when the other spouse has deployed. The benefits some of these groups provide to the Navy and local organizations and charities are significant. I know of some who have raised money in the thousands for charity. Again, I know of no one who has benefited because their spouse is in one of these groups.
I think Lieutenant Nowack needs to get out more and get the chip off his shoulder. I think if he asked around some, he would find several couples who met at one of these "mandatory fun" events. My wife and I were married 14 years ago; 15 years ago I met her at a function I was ordered to attend.
"Submarine Escape Training—Are We Serious?"
(See M. Yawn, pp. 68-69, June 2001 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral John J. Grossenbacher, U.S. Navy, Commander, Naval Submarine Forces Atlantic—This article was very timely in that it coincided with the completion of a review by the submarine force of our submarine rescue and escape capabilities. This review validated many of Lieutenant Yawn's observations, and charts a course for future improvement in these critical areas.
Today's submarine force operates much more frequently in shallow highly trafficked littorals, where the risk of a disabling collision is higher and submarine rescue and escape is feasible. Our review validated the need to reinstitute pressurized submarine escape training, and we are seeking funding to construct a new submarine escape trainer in New London, Connecticut. Until we can get this capability, we are actively seeking opportunities to conduct this training with our allies with near-term plans to train submarine crews in Australia and the United Kingdom. Since 1998, approximately 50 U.S. submariners have been trained. Our escape tank training will involve 100% of the crew, and crews will be required to repeat it periodically. We continue to replace Steinke Hoods with Submarine Escape Immersion Equipment (SEIE) suits. In addition, we will require our crews periodically to demonstrate shipboard escape trunk proficiency during routine exams and certifications.
In addition to escape readiness, our review examined survivability and recoverability of our submarine crews. We are pursuing evaluation of the new damage control systems installed on the Seawolf (SSN-21)-class for back fit to our Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class ships, as well as incorporation of these systems into the new Virginia (SSN-774)-class. Examples of these systems include aqueous foam bilge sprinklers, one-man freshwater firefighting reel hoses, and a low-pressure vestibule for access to the engineering spaces.
Our review identified a need to improve carbon dioxide removal capability from the submarine atmosphere to enhance crew survivability. The capacity of our current method of removing carbon dioxide with lithium hydroxide (LIOH) canisters must be expanded. Until a new technology can be developed and delivered to the fleet, we will provide additional LIOH canisters to our submarines, as well as aggressively pursue acquisition of commercial carbon dioxide removal systems. In addition, reliable battery-operated atmospheric monitoring equipment must be procured to accurately assess the health of the submarine's environment after the ship's electrical power has failed.
Our Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle (DSRV) is an extremely capable rescue platform, although it does have certain limitations. It does not have a "transfer under pressure capability," which could be required because pressure will build up in a disabled submarine from damage control efforts, pressurized system piping ruptures, or emergency air breathing systems. The DSRV also requires a "mother sub" to transport it to the distressed submarine. The replacement for the DSRV system is the Submarine Rescue Diving and Recompression System (SRDRS), which will provide a transfer under pressure capability. Unlike the DSRV, the SRDRS is operated off a vessel of opportunity and does not require a mother sub. The first of two SRDRS is scheduled to be delivered in 2003. Until it is available, we will continue to rely on our allies for transfer under pressure rescues.
With the success of the submarine rescue chamber (SRC), we are evaluating the potential of extending the life of this program out to 2010-2015. The SRC is a relatively inexpensive, reliable system that is well proven in water less than 850 feet deep.
The sailors of the submarine force who take their ships into the unforgiving undersea environment deserve the best training and equipment our nation can provide. Under the best of circumstances rescuing a crew from a disabled submarine is difficult and dangerous. The leadership of the submarine force is committed to providing the capability and crew proficiency necessary to support survival, escape, and rescue of our crews. Our recently completed review sets the submarine force on a solid course to making this happen.
"Defend the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean"
(See J. Harney, pp. 89-90, December 2001 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Derek A. Trinique, U.S. Navy—Lieutenant Harney's assertion that the U.S. Navy should assign Aegis ships to the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (SNFM) as a matter of priority is flawed. The SNFM is right where it belongs on the U.S. Navy's list of priorities. Participation in SNFM expresses the United States' commitment to her NATO allies. However, this participation comes at a cost: one of the five ships in each deploying destroyer squadron is unavailable to Commander, Task Force 60 (CTF 60), the U.S. naval force in the Mediterranean. The SNFM deployer operates with NATO ships, under NATO command and NATO rules of engagement.
In addition, the Atlantic Fleet currently deploys one or two ships in each deploying carrier battle group earlier than the rest of the battle group, and one or two ships late, to cover Global Naval Force Presence Policy (GNFPP) demands in European and Central Commands. This staggered deployment of the battle group further reduces the assets available to U.S. naval forces in the Sixth Fleet.
These force reductions severely limit the ships available to CTF 60 to support national policy and interests. These interests include defense of the deployed carrier and amphibious ready group, maritime interdiction operations, presence operations, and maintaining Tomahawk landattack missile population in each theater as prescribed by the current GNFPP. Staff planners take U.S. interests into account when deciding which ship in each destroyer squadron will change operational command to SNFM. As it happens, some commitments go unfulfilled, yet we maintain our commitment to send a ship to SNFM. Certainly the Navy could assign a destroyer to SNFM, and then recall her for national tasking if we needed an Aegis ship somewhere else, but the political damage that would be done by such a retraction would make it unpalatable.
Lieutenant Harney proposes the establishment of an Aegis criterion for SNFM deployers, to serve as SNFM's air defense commander and improve area air defense and air surveillance. He states that the first deployment of Aegis ships to SNFM will be complicated by "interoperability problems between U.S. Link 16 automatic data transmission systems and the rest of the force, which is equipped with the older Link 11 system." The author raises this point, presumably, to argue that the sooner the Navy begins a new policy of deploying Aegis ships to SNFM, the sooner we can work out the kinks of SNFM's tactical data link architecture.
In truth, all Link 16-capable U.S Navy ships also are equipped with Link 11. SNFM deployers, if equipped with Link 16, simply will have no opportunity to use that system without other Link 16 units. SNFM's tactical data link architecture will be constructed solely around Link 11 until more NATO countries adopt Link 16. Moreover, we should not assume that an Aegis ship automatically would be assigned duties as SNFM air defense commander. I doubt an allied captain in command of an air defense ship would quietly take orders from the commander in command of a U.S. Navy destroyer.
The author's fictional opening vignette, where a Turkish frigate is defenseless against a Yugoslavian antiship cruise missile attack because of a lack of situational awareness on the part of her watchstanders, is not a cogent argument for the deployment of Aegis ships to SNFM. The effective defense of another ship by an Aegis ship is highly dependent on relative stationing. The presence of an Aegis ship in the Adriatic would have made no difference in the fictional attack, unless said Aegis ship were stationed specifically to defend the hapless Turkish frigate. No Aegis ship can defend everyone at once. In addition, the Turkish frigate in question is equipped with her own self-defense systems. If she were that unprepared for self-defense while under way in a threat environment, shame on her. Aegis ships are not the only effective warships in commission today, and the Navy cannot afford to deploy carriers and destroyers specifically to defend NATO ships against rudimentary antiship attacks.
Lieutenant Harney claims that operational tempo in the Adriatic and Mediterranean has increased over the past decade. I know that this is not so. I deployed to the Adriatic and Mediterranean Seas as part of the USS Saratoga (CV-60) battle group in 1994, and again as part of the USS George Washington (CVN-73) battle group in 2000. In 1994, Operations Sharp Guard, Deny Flight, and Provide Promise kept the Saratoga battle group in the Adriatic and Mediterranean for the entirety of our deployment. We operated with French and British carrier battle groups in the Adriatic, under an extremely complex command-and-control architecture.
Last year, the George Washington and a substantial part of her battle group spent the majority of the deployment in Fifth Fleet. Despite the unrest surrounding elections in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, tensions never approached those felt in 1994, when we routinely operated in sight of Yugoslavian missile patrol craft and boarded ships in support of United Nations sanctions.
The Navy already has assigned at least one Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class guided missile destroyer to SNFM. As the guided missile destroyers join the fleet in greater numbers, and the older Spruance (DD-963)-class destroyers and Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigates are retired, Aegis participation in SNFM will increase. Until the Navy can cover all its commitments to our national interests, SNFM will have to take what it can get. Our priorities are properly aligned.
"Don't Forget Dedicated Mine Countermeasures"
(See P. Molenda, pp. 38-41, October 2001 Proceedings)
Captain George Galdorisi, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Having spent the past eight years forward deployed on amphibious ships and with carrier battle groups—and thereby in situations where the threat of adversary mines was ever present—I liked the title of this article. But I had difficulty with the author's premise, allegations, and facts.
There are some things he says that I agree with. He notes that "future mine countermeasure (MCM) operations will rely significantly on organic MCM," and that "the operational commander will be able to neutralize a limited mine threat without having to wait for dedicated MCM forces to arrive," and that "the Navy acknowledges the new organic MCM systems are not a 'silver bullet."' All of these statements are true—but the author uses them to assert that the Navy is abandoning the dedicated MCM assets that we have built up so carefully over the past several decades. Nothing could be further from the truth.
The key words in the sentences above are significantly (as opposed to completely) and limited (as opposed to total). The Navy is in no way purporting to make MCM operations completely organic. Rather, the goal is to provide forward deployed naval forces with a limited capability to begin to deal with the enemy mines to keep them from being completely paralyzed by even the threat of these mines. This is the concept of operations recently endorsed by both Fleet Commanders in the joint instruction Carrier Battle Group/Amphibious Ready Group Mine Warfare Concept of Operations. There are profound reasons why the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Fleet Commanders have endorsed this concept.
In the last half of the 20th century, the United States' response to an enemy or terrorist mine threat was to dial 911 and deploy our dedicated mine countermeasures forces; a triad of surface mine countermeasures ships, mine countermeasures helicopters, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) mine countermeasures detachments. While airborne mine countermeasures forces and EOD MCM detachments had the ability to deploy rapidly, they competed for lift and beddown sites with other forces that might be involved in the conflict, making their timely arrival an ongoing concern, and complicating the efforts of those planning the mine countermeasures campaign.
Exacerbating the challenge of dealing rapidly and effectively with enemy mines has been the fact that the transit speed of U.S. surface mine countermeasures forces—the workhorses of any MCM operation—is agonizingly slow. Therefore, no matter from what ports in the United States they deploy, and whether they are transported by heavy lift vessels or sail on their own, they could not—and still cannot—reach an area such as the Arabian Gulf for several weeks at best.
This paradigm is undergoing a profound change. Instead of simply dialing 911, plans are under way to field a capability that can assess and deal with an adversary mine threat rapidly—albeit in a limited fashion. This capability is built around organic MCM systems that will begin entering the fleet by mid-decade. These organic MCM systems, used in conjunction with our forward-deployed MCM forces in locations such as Bahrain, will allow naval expeditionary forces to have some capability to ensure timely access to the littorals. Organic MCM systems are the next step in the transformation of our mine countermeasures capability as we move from a 911 force to an integral MCM capability—supported by traditional MCM forces—for our naval expeditionary forces.
As these capabilities reach full stride toward the end of this decade, a transformed MCM capability replaces the old MCM triad. This new triad will be comprised of organic MCM systems carried by our forward-deployed naval expeditionary forces, MCM forces forward deployed to key locations such as Bahrain, and U.S.-based supporting MCM forces. This new triad provides joint and coalition forces with the tools to accomplish the MCM mission and is the solution that the author actually (if unwittingly) argues for when he opines, "an organic MCM concept should augment and enhance—not replace—dedicated MCM forces."
But Commander Molenda remains skeptical and postulates a "glass half empty" view regarding the fielding of these systems. He views the new MCM plan as one that facilitates "complete freedom of maneuver for surface combatants," a concept that is not embedded in the concept of operations, which repeatedly calls for assigned MCM assets to enable naval expeditionary forces to begin to conduct limited MCM operations.
The author argues that since some technologies for assigned MCM are still in development, the fielding of this capability is not assured—ignoring the fact that no known military development program has been completely risk-free at this stage of development and also ignoring the fact that there are multiple components to this overarching capability. Thus, if one aspect of this capability is delayed, it is only one portion of a comprehensive package, enssuring that a robust capability will be delivered nonetheless. His pessimism that these systems will ever be fielded is based on his assertion that mine-related programs will "lose steam" in future budget battles, quoting an eight-year-old think tank study as a source of this profound knowledge.
Commander Molenda's assertion that adding MCM capabilities to already-full surface combatants will press these ships for space and lead to task saturation ignores the collective Navy and Marine Corps experience in introducing new weapon systems into the fleet and the field. Invariably, new systems find a workable home somewhere, and adaptable and flexible sailors and Marines embrace change and the opportunities afforded by new systems designed to deal with new or emerging threats.
Many of us have been at the tip of the spear and have been called on to conduct contingency operations with no notice and in an environment where no MCM assets could reach us for weeks! As the Navy-Marine Corps team enhances its forward-deployed presence as articulated in "Naval Vision 2020," the need to be prepared to conduct limited MCM operations while awaiting the arrival of supporting MCM forces will only increase. As Commander Molenda prepares to reenter the fleet as a LAMPS pilot, one would think that he would welcome this additional arrow in the operational quiver.
"Interview: John Lehman"
(See F. Schultz, pp. 70-73, December 2001 Proceedings)
Captain Keith F Kopets, U.S. Marine Corps—I agree with Mr. Lehman that "we've created too many joint staffs." But Congress has blood on its hands, too. Military staffs have grown correspondingly with congressional staffs. A 30-minute visit to DefenseLink (www.defenselink.mil) made me shiver. There is a staggering bureaucracy among the House and Senate Armed Service Committees, the Senate Appropriations Committee, and the myriad of subcommittees to those agencies. There may be hope, however. In the first week of December, a Senate committee—with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's blessing—proposed a cap on the number of military liaison officers to Capitol Hill. Maybe this Senate action will have a ripple effect on our stovepiped joint and component military staffs. 51
"Combat Fleets"
(See A.D. Baker, p. 124, October 2001 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Robert L. Turner, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—This article reports that as part of the Swedish Navy's process of modernization the 18th Fast Patrol Boat Squadron based at Karlskrona was disestablished on 1 July 2001, leaving Sweden's west coast without a single combat warship based there. Karlskrona is a naval base facing south on the lower part of Sweden's east coast.
Sweden has steadfastly held to a strict neutrality policy for 200 years, but it has seen that stance challenged first by the end of the Cold War, in which it straddled the continental divide between Eastern and Western Europe, and now by the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. Swedes from across the political spectrum have expressed the belief that neutrality no longer is just outdated but also indefensible in the new world order.
The country now deploys troops on U.N. peacekeeping missions and is developing new weapons and a rapid reaction force for the European Union, of which Sweden has been a member since 1995. Although 65% of Sweden's 9 million citizens still oppose formal membership in NATO, Sweden has participated in NATO military maneuvers, and Swedish troops are under NATO command in the Balkans and are full members in Partnership for Peace (a NATO-organized military cooperation network).
With the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania likely to become members of NATO, only Finland and Sweden will be without clear responsibilities for the region's defense. For years, Sweden has been discussing with its EU allies in NATO how to insure its weaponry and armed forces are compatible with other defense units on the continent—a clear sign that the country recognizes the inevitability of military as well as economic cooperation.
As one of Europe's most technologically advanced countries, Sweden also is involved with five other participants, all NATO members, in a project to enhance regional readiness and upgrade military equipment. Sweden's leading arms manufacturers are all at least partially owned by companies in NATO countries. The modernization described, including development of the Visby-class of stealth combatants, gives evidence that Sweden can no longer chose the option of neutrality in the face of threats to fundamental democratic values presented by the events of 11 September 2001.
"Who Are Our Quiet Warriors?"
(See D. Grange, pp. 44-45, November 2001 Proceedings)
Cary Feldmann, former specialist, U.S. Army Rangers—The picture on page 44 of a "U.S. Army Ranger" is totally ate-- up. First, the Army wears its unit patch on the left shoulder, and the front man's patch clearly is identifiable as the 1 st/508th Airborne Brigade Combat Team, Vicenza, Italy. Plus, he's carrying an M-16 while the 75th has had the compact M-4s since 1993.
The second guy in the stack would have a major beating—I mean correctional therapy from a caring NCO—because his weapon is pointing into his team leader's back. Worse, if you assume that the door is to their left, where the #1 man is pointing, he will be moving to his left, immediately in front of the fully automatic M-249 squad automatic weapon, before he gets into the room. Big no-no.
"Warfighting Brought to You By..."
(See J. Cowan, pp. 61-64, November 2001 Proceedings)
Captain Rick Jacobs, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Major Cowan presents a brief summary of a subtle and useful doctrine of warfare, and certainly has done us a service thereby. I do not wish to denigrate the work of either Mr. Lind or Colonel Boyd. But like all doctrines, maneuver warfare is subject to overextension and misuse. I would like to offer another perspective on strategy.
History is replete with military revolutions, from distributed computer networks back to the stirrup and beyond. Maneuver warfare is not a new concept. It was an essential part of the strategy and tactics of Genghis Khan, Napoleon, George Patton, and the U.S. Navy in World War II. Implying that it is somehow a "revolutionary" strategy leads us to ignore many important lessons. The core principles of strategy and tactics have not changed since Alexander the Great.
Maneuver must not be overemphasized at the expense of attrition or destruction. Maneuver is a tactic, not an objective. The ultimate objective of warfare must be the destruction of the enemy. Napoleon was as gifted at strategic and tactical maneuver as any general in history, but he decisively defeated the armies of the ancien regime by knowing when to cease maneuver and destroy the foe in battle. It is generally conceded that the Japanese defeat at Midway was caused in no small measure by an operational plan gone mad on maneuver with task forces scattered across thousands of miles of ocean.
There is a danger that phrases such as a goal of collapsing the enemy internally rather than physically destroying him" will lead to such monumental errors as the failure to pursue and destroy the "defeated" Iraqi Army in 1991, the Chinese Army in Korea in 1951, or the British Army at Dunkirk in 1941. In each instance a judgment was made that the enemy was collapsing, and in each instance the pursuer had cause for regret at not destroying the enemy when the chance presented itself.
Perhaps the greatest example of maneuver warfare in history is the naval campaign across the Pacific in World War II. An integral part of that campaign was the "attrition" warfare at Guadalcanal, Tarawa, and other bloody Navy and Marine Corps battles. An effective strategy must have its measure of both maneuver and destruction.
"If It's War, Treat It That Way"
(See M. Faraks, pp.. 36-37. December 2001 Proceedings)
"Are We Really At War"
(See G. Solis, pp. 34-40, December 2001 Proceedings)
Captain Michael C. Farkas, U.S. Army Reserve, senior trial assistant district attorney, Homicide Bureau, Brooklyn District Attorney's Office, New York—Since writing my article advocating the use of military courts-martial over domestic criminal courts to prosecute captured terrorists, President George W. Bush commendably has proposed the use of military tribunals to try terrorists as war criminals. While some have criticized this idea as being an archaic affront to civil liberties, I find it to be a reasonable and viable tool. Most important, however, its legality has been clearly and concisely upheld under the closest of constitutional scrutiny. Implementing the use of tribunals therefore becomes a question of policy, not law.
Legal scholars advocating the use of tribunals have correctly cited diverse sources ranging from Alexander Hamilton's Federalist Papers (particularly #23 on how national security powers ought to exist without limitation) to the World War II Supreme Court decisions in Ex Parte Quirin. (upholding the use of secret military tribunals to try captured German soldiers operating covertly in the continental United States) and Korematsu v. United States (sanctioning the extreme, yet permissible, policy of internment). Those same scholars also are quick to refer to Congress' 14 September resolution authorizing the President to use "all necessary and appropriate force." Taken together, and in noting that the Supreme Court has never reversed its rulings on tribunals or internment, the President is on firm legal ground in establishing military tribunals by executive order.
The policy considerations behind these proposals therefore become paramount. In my opinion, the need to protect secrets related to national security, and the desire for swift and certain justice, combined with the clear precedent establishing that war criminals are not entitled to the same due process guarantees as that of our civil defendants, all amount to compelling requirements during a time of national emergency. A simple reading of the relevant Supreme Court decisions make the law and policy questions readily answerable.
Critics should recognize that tribunals need not ignore the Constitution, or necessarily do away with fundamental guarantees such as the right to counsel or the right to appear before a fair judiciary body. While the standard of proof and rules of evidence may differ from that of a domestic court, it is more than likely that captured terrorists will be treated with far more fairness and decency than they deserve.
"Regionalization: An Insider's View"
(See J. Bouchard, pp. 84-87, October 2001 Proceedings)
Captain J. L. Harris, U.S. Navy (Retired)—I guess how you stand depends on where you sit. If one is comfortable sitting in a matrix organization, then it is natural to tout its accomplishments. As a former naval station commanding officer and the very last Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet N-46, I am compelled to speak in defense of the "old days."
Captain Bouchard notes his station's mobilization of resources in support of the USS Cole's (DDG-67) families and crew. All right, but during Desert Shield/Desert Storm the six San Diego commanding officers pooled resources and services in support of mission and families with the full support and encouragement of three type commanders.
Tugs? The commanding officer of Naval Station San Diego outsourced tug operations in 1994 with the full support and engagement of the type commander. All tug operations in San Diego were centralized at Naval Station San Diego by 1995, before regionalization.
Coordination? I do not recall ever telling a base commanding officer no, even when it involved reordering budget objectives or modifying station policy or practices.
Savings? Could be, but claiming budget marks as savings is a slippery slope.
I couldn't agree more with noting the Navy working capital fund albatross. Regardless of shore station management system, when you pay $250 for a $50 plumbing job, and limit your commanding officer's contracting authority and incentives, you are making minimal headway.
Sure, a shore infrastructure system with 17 claimants is difficult to defend. I don't know what the right number is, but to those of us at Surface Force, Pacific, there seemed to be a certain logic to owning ships, shore stations, and people. We knew our customers and they knew us. Most important, we had the budget flexibility to balance requirements and resources, and recoup savings.
On the other hand, considering the passage of time and my present focus, I can only say, "smooth sailing."
But please don't storefront my Navy exchange, commissary, and Balboa Derm clinic.
"The Air Force Is Disarming Itself"
(See E. Riccioni, pp. 80-83, November 2001; P. Madden, pp. 18-20, December 2001 Proceedings)
Michael L. McDaniel, Naval Air Systems Command—I read Colonel Riccioni's article with great interest and some amusement. He spends a great deal of time bashing the F-22, right after claiming credit for starting the program, and then finishes with a vague call for a "extensively modified and corrected" acquisition system.
But you can't solve problems with slogans. I'd therefore like to offer the following concrete ideas for fixing the acquisition system:
- True competition. Today, competition means evaluating paper proposals, or at best flying prototype aircraft with a vague similarity to a combat machine. If history shows anything, it's that the instant you downselect to a single vendor, you are stuck. You either buy the product the contractor sells, when he wants to sell it, and at the price he sets, or you do without. The Department of Defense needs to stop playing the paper games and go back to testing combat-worthy hardware. No engineering and manufacturing development process after the selection of a winner—if the hardware isn't ready for the fleet, buy elsewhere. True competition worked with the F-4 and F-8, and it will work again.
- Requirements from the fleet. Today, requirements for new weapon systems are generated at the flag level, and staffed through a convoluted joint process guaranteed to kill what little innovation may have crept in at the start. Acquisition agencies need to ask the fleet what is required—and address the questions, not to admirals, but to lieutenant commanders and senior chiefs, and maybe even a wellinformed civilian or two. At this level, experience and innovation blend, producing requirements that are based in reality, but not wedded to the past. Combine this with a streamlined staffing process, and we can come up with some solid requirements.
- Try the unorthodox. Real innovation has been lacking of late, in large part because the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is the only significant DoD component exempt from the strangulation of DoD-5000 acquisition procedures. And one of the biggest problems is that the current process offers no opening for unusual approaches. There are too many people in the approval chain. What's needed is a "unusual ideas office" (possibly within DARPA), with the ability to support concepts both from its own staff and from the fleet.
As to the F-22, allow me to suggest an unorthodox idea of my own—revive the lightweight fighter concept, but omit all sensors other than a basic forward-looking infrared radar. Sensors on dedicated platforms such as the E-2 and E-8 now have the ability to provide fire-control-- quality data in real time, eliminating the need for a fighter radar. And precision munitions make a large bomb load unnecessary. Build a fighter around one pilot, one gun, one advanced medium-range air-to-air missile, two Sidewinders (or one AIM-9 and a 500-lb laser-guided bomb)—and all the performance possible. I suspect that the result would weigh around 10,000 pounds, cost around $10 million, and fight as well as anything on the drawing boards. It's worth a try.
"The Dark Side of Globalization"
(See E. Malone, A. Rachwald, p. 43, November 2001 Proceedings)
Captain Edward B. Hontz, U.S. Navy—The authors present a thought-provoking look at democracy and capitalism. Boiled down, their thesis is that globalization causes losers in addition to winners, and capitalization creates poverty in addition to wealth in a process called "creative destruction." The United States is the primary "winner" in globalization, which creates resentment and a "sense of democratic superiority" in the United States. Therefore, the United States should take a "softer and gentler" approach to "soften [globalization's] inherent destructive propensities."
I believe they have it exactly wrong. It's surprising the authors don't know that Joseph Schumpeter's "creative destruction" has nothing to do with the generation of poverty, but rather the evolutionary nature of capitalism, which incorporates new technology, opens new markets, and provides for the demise of companies no longer able to compete under new circumstances and their replacement by more innovative entrepreneurial businesses. If they believe this process is inherently destructive, the authors would reject the very basis of our capitalistic economy, and they don't tell us with what they would replace it.
I would like the authors to show me where capitalism creates poverty. Japan? Western Europe? The United States? Singapore? Or are they talking about second- and third-world countries? Again, show me the countries that actually are poorer as a result of opening their markets, reducing tariffs, and participating in the new global economy.
Contrary to popular opinion, the United States has not used globalization to become rich on the backs of its trading partners. Our productivity and penchant for hard work have allowed us to have large trade deficits benefiting our trading partners, while at the same time growing our economy, producing wealth, and taking large numbers of people off our own welfare roles.
In addition, while the United States was expanding globalization during the last half century, the spread of democracy has been either a major cause or effect in the improvement of the lot of mankind. Today, for the first time in the history of the world, more people on the globe than not are living under governments of their own choosing. Does that mean we have solved world hunger? No, but we are making progress.
Extreme fundamentalists tend to spawn in extreme poverty in nondemocratic countries, often when the disadvantaged see a growing middle class in their societies. The terrorists often are better educated and disaffected for social, religious, and political reasons. We certainly should have financial and foreign policies which address how we interact with these countries in a positive manner, but that does not negate the overwhelmingly positive balance of outcomes from open international information and trade exchange.
I reject the authors' theory that democracy and globalization create either poverty or terrorists, and I reject their intimation that there is something wrong with having a sense of democratic superiority. Without that sense, swearing to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies seems rather hollow. I would prefer to believe that our efforts to end communism, reduce global poverty, and improve the global standard of living and access to technology, information, and medical care over the past 20 years are not things for which to apologize. Rather than a "softer, gentler" approach, I would prefer a policy of unconditional surrender in this war, after which a new political creative destruction can result in more nations joining with those elected governments, where murder is considered a crime, and free markets can work to improve the lot of all.
"To Abayas Or Not?"
Lieutenant Commander Jacqueline A. Gravell, U.S. Navy—One must take at face value the commander's policy requiring active-duty women to wear the Muslim robe known as abayas when they go off base in Saudi Arabia. It is intended as a force protection measure as well as to show our Saudi hosts that we desire to act as good guests. It was not intended as an act of gender or religion-based discrimination. It was intended to protect our military women from unprovoked attacks from the religious police. However, the emotionally charged issues of discrimination are obscuring the fact that the policy may actually be placing the military women in more danger rather than less—particularly now as the subject reaches the scream level.
With nearly four consecutive years overseas—first in Spain and then in the Republic of Korea—I know first hand the challenges the average active-duty military faces when trying to blend into the host country's environment. It takes some effort for most U.S. service members, even those of similar ethnic backgrounds, but in general it is even more difficult for a woman. Because women are a minority in most military communities, it is even a challenge within the United States for a woman to blend in. Our faces stand out among the troops. In an overseas environment, that is even more true.
At large overseas bases with the infrastructure available to support families, the numbers of women increase. But most people present on the base, including the local nationals, know which women are military and which are not. Specifically, they know the women who are in positions of authority or relative seniority.
Anyone who has traveled throughout the Middle East will confirm that the locals are very astute at determining what nationality a traveler is. If they are trying to sell you something, they will pepper you with offers to get you to respond in your native language. Tourist group schedules are known and infatida-scheduled strikes are modified to accommodate. Ships' schedules are deduced by the local merchants before it is common knowledge among the rest of the base occupants. The point is, average locals, even the children, are cunning and resourceful.
The Saudis and anyone else who desires probably already can identify which women are active duty, who are the U.S. government employees, and who are the nongovernment individuals. That includes the shop owners, the local mullahs, and members of al-qaeda. It can be guaranteed that they know who Lieutenant Colonel Martha McSally, U.S. Air Force, is. They probably knew who she was the moment her foot touched Saudi Arabia. If not, they certainly do now because of all the publicity associated with the controversy of wearing the abayas.
The policy as it stands increases the probability that an American woman in abayas departing the base is active-duty military. It acts as a vehicle to segregate the military from the nonmilitary. This makes the active-duty American woman a more easily identifiable target. And there are indications that the death of a woman increases the political gains for a terrorist. In his book Holy War, Inc., Peter Bergen describes a terrorist kidnapping in Egypt that ends tragically. In the final shoot-out, the terrorist leader tells his lieutenant "to kill a woman, any woman." That terrorist obviously saw women as a politically valuable target.
Our U.S. military commanders in Saudi Arabia obviously understood the social dynamics and the political realities of the role of Islamic women on the Arabian Peninsula. There was a high probability that any nonconforming woman in Saudi Arabia risked physical harm from the religious police. Thus they set the current policy to protect the military from unprovoked attacks and to show a sensitivity to the host country's social morals. But it needs to be rethought on the basis of demographics and social realities as seen by the host country or our enemies, not as perceived by Americans. We sometimes forget when we walk out the base gate that we are not leaving the United States with all her insular protections and walking into a foreign country, but that we are only crossing from one side of the street to another in a foreign and sometimes hostile country. Each American's actions are scrutinized in a manner and to a degree that we are not accustomed to while we are in the United States.
The political reality is that Osama bin Laden resents the presence of the U.S. military on the Arabian Peninsula. That fact alone means that all U.S. military could be targets. Our identities are not hidden just because we are in an U.S. military-controlled space. For the average U.S. military woman, an abayas will not hide the fact that she is U.S. military; it now has the opposite effect of ensuring that she is identified as military.
The argument should not be about gender or religious issues. It should focus on force protection. Does the policy increase or decrease the level of security? Does the current policy in effect focus the bore sight on active-duty military, not just the women but the men who must escort them? Unless all the U.S.-sponsored women abide by the same dress standards, the risk level increases. We are culling out a segment of the population from the herd and possibly setting them up as easy targets. It is all about managing risks and protecting our troops to the best of our ability.
"Homeland Security Is a Coast Guard Mission"
(See S. Flynn, pp. 72-75 October 2001; M. Adams, pp. 18-20, November 2001 Proceedings)
Commander F R. "Joe" Call, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired), Homeland Security Consultant, Booz Allen Hamilton—11 September robbed the United States of its sense of security and what we believed to be the period of peace we were enjoying, stole our confidence, and shook our economy. The promise and potential of the thousands of lives lost also were stolen on that morning.
At a lesser level, the events of 11 September robbed the United States of something more subtle, but nonetheless important—the chance to carefully, deliberately, and diligently come to grips with the challenges that homeland security manifests. There was a vice presidential task force on homeland security that likely will never meet. There were forums, discussions, and debates, but few answers. The problem of homeland security was never bounded, the definitions never agreed to and finalized.
Compared to what happened that might not sound too alarming. Still, there is much to be said for making decisions after taking the time and investing the intellectual capital to analyze and synthesize all the information. Crisis decision making doesn't always yield the best decisions and even more seldom the best policies.
Had U.S. policymakers thought longer and harder about what constitutes homeland security, they likely would have come up with a definition beyond the narrow counterterrorism focus in vogue right now. Just as national security is more than defense against foreign threats, homeland security deals with more than counter terrorism and missile defense. By almost any standard, homeland security should include the protection of our economic strength, and sovereignty and defense of our borders. This expands the taxonomy of threats to homeland security to include narcotics smuggling, illegal migration, international organized crime, and theft of natural resources. An even broader reading of homeland security could include protecting the safety and security of people and our environment against threats both man-made and not.
This more inclusive view of homeland security leads to a similar view of maritime homeland security. Maritime homeland security is more than port security. Port security is merely one aspect of a larger maritime homeland security tapestry. Maritime homeland security should include the sovereignty of our maritime borders and territory, defense against the threat of all contraband smuggling—drugs, illegal migrants, or weapons of mass destruction. It embraces the protection of lives and property, the sanctity of our natural resources and economic commerce. All of these add to our national strength and therefore our security.
All of these missions are Coast Guard missions. An agency that was born of many agencies, the Coast Guard combines in one organization the authorities and responsibilities of both the law enforcement community and the armed services. Uniquely positioned, the Coast Guard is the appropriate agency to lead in the maritime homeland security arena. It does not take intellectual gymnastics to look at the recently validated roles and missions of the U.S. Coast Guard and see the framework for maritime homeland security.
Since 11 September, the Coast Guard has realigned it forces and its focus within the broader framework of the maritime security mission, which includes traditional Coast Guard missions. This has affected counterdrug operations, fisheries patrol, and illegal migrant interdiction. A boatload of 150 Haitians in Florida waters foreshadows real concern, and Cuba still lies just 90 miles away. Illegal migrant interdiction, law enforcement, and search and rescue don't go away. They are all essential elements of a more comprehensive concept of maritime homeland security.
Realignment of missions and sustainment of effort are two frequently heard watch phrases for the Coast Guard of late. These are the challenges of the "new normalcy." As the Coast Guard realigns its missions and shifts it priorities, it is worth considering that the Coast Guard is not reducing traditional mission emphasis to address a new mission of maritime security, but is instead realigning within its broader and traditional maritime homeland security mission to address the most pressing threats and missions of the day. To sustain this new level of effort and to continue the other missions within maritime homeland security is not merely cutting the budget pie into new slices, but instead increasing the size of the pie itself.
With a character like a fire department, the Coast Guard responds when called upon, be it the Mariel Boat Lift, the oil spill from the Exxon Valdez, or the new level of maritime homeland security. Commandant of the Coast Guard Admiral James Loy has called maritime security the Coast Guard's north star. That is an appropriate description. If the Coast Guard steers a course with the north star of maritime homeland security as an azimuth, it will have a trackline dead reckoning with its traditional missions, its present missions, and likely its future missions.