U.S. military presence in Asia stands to be greatly reduced during the next quarter century. This will have extensive security implications throughout the region and will affect directly the readiness and warfighting capabilities of our joint forces. In spite of numerous historical examples illustrating the results of a decreased U.S. military presence, most senior U.S. officials continue to ignore Asia and assume our joint forces always will enjoy easy access throughout the Pacific region. This assumption stems from several misconceptions:
- Political change in the region and reductions in U.S. military presence will take place slowly.
- Asian countries will support a military presence from the world's only superpower because they must or because it is in their best interests.
- Technology and alternate military sites will compensate for any reduction in forces from U.S. bases in Asia.
It is becoming increasingly important for the United States to maintain access and influence in Asia. After Canada and Mexico, Asia is this nation's largest trading partner, surpassing Europe and the rest of the Western Hemisphere. Yet debate goes on about whether Europe or the Western Hemisphere is more important than Asia or whether the United States should look at Asia as only a part of Eurasia. Even in U.S. defense circles, only the radical dare to postulate that "the military is too focused on Europe and not enough on Asia, and needs to shift its geographical and spending priorities."
Failure to appreciate the enormous impact of the Asian region will have significant consequences. According to the authors of Megatrends 2000, "Any way you measure it, geographically, demographically, or economically, the Pacific Rim is a powerful global presence." The Asian region encompasses the world's largest geographic area, including ten strategic straits. It boasts the world's largest population. Economically, Asia has the largest amount of world trade—almost $2.5 trillion in imports and exports—and the largest holdings of foreign reserves, with China, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea accounting for $700 billion. The Pacific region has the largest concentration of military power, emerging as the largest recipient of arms transfers since it doubled military spending in the 1990s; it is home to seven of the world's ten largest armies. To ignore Asia, or even to fail to make it a top priority, is to jeopardize U.S. national security.
Potential for Abrupt Change
Current U.S. military presence in Asia includes more than 100,000 Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps personnel stationed primarily in Japan (49,000) and Korea (42,000). From these forward locations, the United States is able to project ground, sea, and air forces. These central locations also support enormous logistical stockpiles built up since the late 1940s and 1950s.
Asian countries do not have to submit to the United States as the world's only superpower. There are numerous examples of countries that resisted the military influence of superpowers. In the early 1970s, as Egypt prepared to take military action against Israel, support from the Soviet Union proved to be limited and conditional as a result of that superpower's commitment to a policy of detente. President Anwar Sadat ejected all Soviet forces from Egypt in a surprising move in mid-1972. Then in 1973, going against the will of both superpowers, opposing an enemy with a superior military, and against the backdrop of a poor historical record of achievement, Egypt attacked Israel. The October 1973 War immediately restored Egyptian honor and Egyptian control of the Suez Canal. It eventually caused the return of the Sinai oil fields to Egypt and forced the superpowers to support a negotiated peace between Egypt and Israel.
The more recent loss of the U.S. bases in the Philippines provides the best example of a smaller country defying a superpower and the tenuous nature of U.S. access to the Asian region through its military presence. The U.S. military facilities in the Philippines were referred to in 1990 as the "cornerstone of our regional basing structure and military presence. . . . No single potential replacement site could accommodate all of the functions now performed in the Philippines, and none would share the strategic Philippine Location." In 1991, Mount Pinatubo erupted, destroying Clark Air Base. Then, in 1992, the Philippine government took control of Subic Naval Base and Cubi Point Air Station after the Philippine Senate rejected renegotiated basing agreements. In just two years, the United States lost its "cornerstone" in Asia.
Power of Domestic Politics
While the argument may be true that U.S. forces in Asia provide stability for all in the best international interests of the countries in that region, it does not prevent those same countries from opposing U.S. military presence because of domestic issues. As former House Speaker Tip O'Neill said, "All politics is local." Just as the Philippine Senate rejected the renewal of U.S. military facilities more on the basis of national pride than economic or security reasons, the governments of Japan and South Korea could be forced to ask the United States to leave because of domestic political pressure.
Okinawa houses 75% of U.S. armed forces, yet it accounts for only 0.6% of Japan's total land area. Brutalized by both the United States and Japan during World War II, Okinawa has been occupied by the United States ever since. Okinawans feel alienated and believe the mainland Japanese largely have ignored their long-standing complaints about the U.S. military, which include seizure of land from private owners, noise pollution and other environmental issues, loss of revenue from tourism, increased taxes to support the U.S. bases, the danger of live-fire exercises, and other incidents that disrupt the lives of the civilian population. This growing Okinawan resentment was galvanized into general Japanese anger after the rape of a 12-year-old Okinawan schoolgirl by U.S. servicemen in 1995. Now, because of the sensitivity of the situation, even minor incidents become international news. Local opposition to U.S. forces on Okinawa continues to grow despite U.S. concessions.
Domestic complaints about U.S. forces in South Korea center on the U.S. role in directly or indirectly supporting different South Korean dictators, coup d'etats, and subsequent brutality. The United States is seen by many as responsible for many atrocities, from Syngman Rhee and the massacre of dissidents on Cheju Island to General Tae Woo Roh and his conviction for sedition, accepting bribes, and involvement in the murder of demonstrators in Kwangju. Even Richard Holbrooke in his role as peacemaker received criticism because, "under the U.S. policies he helped develop, the military prolonged its rule in South Korea, delaying the transition to democracy and taking the lives of many demonstrators." Only recently, after lengthy protests, did the United States admit that U.S. Army soldiers killed innocent South Korean civilians at No Gun Ri during the early stages of the Korean War. As relations with North Korea begin to thaw, more and more South Koreans are questioning the need for U.S. forces.
In addition, because only Japan and South Korea host major U.S. bases in Asia, whichever country first asks the United States to leave presents the other with a dilemma. Citizens of the country with the remaining base will question supporting the only U.S. forces stationed in Asia and will view this requirement with resentment, characterizing the situation as oppression by a superpower. The fact that there is a significant amount of animosity and competition between Japan and South Korea will only fuel this sentiment as each country races to be the first to have U.S. forces leave its homeland.
Inadequacy of Alternatives
In the future, threats within Asia will come from old animosities, rivalry for energy sources, and competition over markets and products. The numerous ethnically and culturally diverse countries in the region, the Spratly Islands and their potential oil reserves, and the "little tigers" and their markets will need protection. Unfortunately, technology will not compensate for significant reductions in forces from existing U.S. bases in Asia; the United States will need to maintain a visible presence in the form of air, naval, and ground forces. Even operations at the low end of the military spectrum are manpower intensive and require a base of operations. Admiral James M. Loy, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, recently said:
[Suspect vessels] can't be blown up from over the horizon. Somebody has to engage these vessels one at a time, up close and personal. Somebody has to distinguish the suspicious from the obviously innocent. To separate the guilty from the merely suspicious, somebody has to get alongside and put a boarding team aboard, even if the suspect vessels resist or won't stop. Once aboard, somebody has to exercise sound judgment about employing such physical force as may be necessary to maintain the safety of the boarding teams and the crews of the vessels boarded. Somebody has to size up each case and dispose of it based on the complex humanitarian, diplomatic, military, geo-political, environmental, and legal issues at stake.
Although he was speaking about drug enforcement off the coasts of the United States, Admiral Loy's remarks are just as applicable to a humanitarian operation or a peacekeeping mission, protecting the sea lines of communication, or enforcing an embargo in the Pacific. As military operations rise from low to medium intensity, the need for operating bases increases. While technology can enhance U.S. presence, it cannot replace it. Computers, satellites, precision-guided munitions, and stealth aircraft do not eliminate the need for personnel and logistics in the area of operations.
Alternate sites for U.S. personnel and equipment based in Asia are difficult to find and have many trade-offs. Any replacement for forces now based in Japan and South Korea would require a secure and friendly host country, large start-up costs, and extensive lead time. Alternate bases in Australia would be just as far from the Korean Peninsula as they would be from Hawaii. Other areas such as Singapore, a current site of limited naval facilities, are so small that expansion is impractical and would create many of the same problems that take place on Okinawa. Even in a U.S. territory such as Guam, small and far from Japan and Korea, there could be domestic protests similar to the troubles that took place in Puerto Rico.
Conclusions
Unlike Europe, where U.S. military strategy depends on a multilateral defense structure (NATO), strategy in the Pacific depends on bilateral agreements. This and the many threats in the Asian region are why the United States has relied on the concept of forward presence to maintain stability. However, even with the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States has not shifted its focus from Europe long enough to imagine the potential future loss of military presence in Asia.
A reunification of the Korean Peninsula or a major economic depression could provide the spark that fires demand for the quick removal of U.S. forces from South Korea and Japan. Long-standing animosities against Japan could create tensions that might cause Japan to reexamine its constitutional military role. Instability in China, India, or Indonesia, together comprising half of the world's population, could spill over into other countries in the region with serious consequences. Any of these actions could instigate an arms buildup in the region. Political turmoil and unrest could place U.S. citizens living in Asia in great danger. Competition for resources and markets and aggression against our allies could result in hostilities that affect U.S. national interests. The United States, lacking an adequate number of air and sea transports, with limited amphibious ships, and no land bases in the region, then would be faced with the consequences of its reduced military presence.
As the only superpower, the United States has the opportunity to promote world peace and prosperity. In any given region, U.S. military power supports diplomatic and economic power. Therefore, the United States must be able to project sustained military power quickly across the spectrum of operations around the globe. Current joint deployment doctrine requires large ports and airfields provided by host countries or seized from the enemy. The farther away these ports and airfields are from U.S. bases, the greater the length of time required for the deployment and buildup of combat power and, therefore, the greater the risk.
In the 1960s, the United States was at the height of its presence in Asia and had almost unlimited access. In addition to bases in Japan and South Korea, the United States had major operational bases in the Philippines, Vietnam, and Thailand. Even after pulling out of Vietnam at the end of that conflict in the 1970s, the United States had almost twice as many Navy ships in the region as compared to today. By the 1990s, the loss of the air and naval bases in the Philippines, coupled with the military drawdown, cut U.S. presence in Asia by half. Must U.S. presence in this region approach zero before Americans realize the value of what was lost and begin to reevaluate the U.S. national military strategy concerning Asia? The vast area of the Pacific region requires a U.S. presence to maintain stability. Instead of assuming we always will have bases in Japan and South Korea, U.S. officials need to assess the actions and resources needed to maintain access to this region and begin contingency preparations.
Colonel Bennett, assigned to Headquarters Marine Corps, is a graduate of the National War College, Air War College, Armed Forces Staff College, Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting and Command and Staff College. He has served in a variety of command and staff billets in the continental United States and overseas.