As reflected in our National Defense Strategy, uncertainty is a defining feature of our dynamic and complex global environment. The most likely threats to our country will result from the chronic instability that continues to spread in much of the developing world. According to the Marine Corps Mid-Range Threat Assessment 2005
2015, several "drivers of instability," including transnational extremism, constitute the greatest threats to our national interests abroad (see MCIA-1586-001-05, Marine Corps Midrange Threat Estimate: 2005-2015 [Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, August 2005], p. vi). We can choose to react—or we can take proactive measures.As the U.S. military partners with nations in less stable regions, our forces are increasingly being used to facilitate growth and capacity building. Lieutenant Colonel Zeman describes these efforts in his accompanying article "Marines Adapt the Long War Concept." The service's move toward the development of Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Forces (SC MAGTF) demonstrates that our senior leaders recognize the situation.
One of the more revolutionary, contentious, and misunderstood features of the SC MAGTF is the regional focus of the units that will be sourced for it. Through examining regionalization as a way to create effective SC MAGTF, we can dispel some of those misconceptions. Far from detracting from operational readiness, regionalization will actually be a potent combat multiplier.
The Mechanisms of Regionalization
Two components are necessary to implement a regional focus for Marine operating force units. The first is to consistently deploy the same units to the same countries or region as a means to build operational experience. The second is to staff these units with Marines who have in-depth understanding of the environment.
The first component will lead to more knowledgeable Marines based on individual experiences, but it will not provide a framework for contextualizing those experiences. On the other hand, Marines with academic or firsthand experience may not be able to bridge the gap between theory (or cultural awareness) and operations. This is why the two components need to be implemented together.
Operational experience will be best achieved by assigning the same units to deploy to the same region as elements of an SC MAGTF. Over time, the experience gained by these units will be cumulative and support a solid knowledge base, both for themselves and for their adjacent units that rotate for deployment as SC MAGTF combat elements. At the highest level, this foundation of experience will include personal and professional relationships with members of foreign security forces abroad—relationships that will be indispensible in sustaining effective training programs.
As an example 2nd Marine Regiment might be assigned as the Africa Regiment for the Marine Corps. First Battalion, 2nd Marines would provide the ground combat element for any SC MAGTF requirements in Africa, rotating with 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines; and 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines to support building partnership capacity (BPC) missions across the African continent. Similar rotations would be implemented for the elements that constituted the aviation and logistics sections of the SC MAGTF.
Over time the operational experience of the units that source the SC MAGTF will compound. Assuming that an average enlistment affords a Marine the opportunity to deploy twice with his battalion or squadron for 7 months, with 14 months at home between deployments (in a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell cycle), the units should always have at least 40 percent of the deployable personnel with direct regional experience.
These seasoned trainers will provide the model for the next generation. The ability of the regiments, wings, and Marine logistics groups to identify trends, troubleshoot problems, and assess progress will also grow exponentially.
Enhancing this growth in operational experience should be the assignment of regional specialists to the units that source the SC MAGTF. This second component may require some greater changes and shifts in resources than simply repeatedly deploying to a particular geographic region. Indeed, several of the initiatives discussed here will require significant changes in the way we use some of the service's existing capabilities while creating new programs.
Reorganize Education and Assignments
First, we should assign officers and NCOs who have appropriate Career Marine Regional Studies (CMRSP) backgrounds to the units that source the SC MAGTF. The CMRSP was implemented in 2006 through the efforts of the Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning. Its purpose is to instill a greater appreciation and understanding of regional awareness through assigning of one of 17 study areas to every graduate of the Basic School and the Sergeants Course. Following the assignment of their micro-regions, the officers and NCOs are directed to learn as much as possible about the wider area, including cultural, political, and linguistic elements.
But micro-region assignment does not currently correspond with duty station assignments. When this concept was first implemented by Marine Corps Combat Development Command, the intent was to provide Marine leaders with micro-region assignments throughout the operating forces. This would ensure that a commander could tap into an array of regional expertise.
A better use of these assets would be to assign at least 50 percent of the officer and NCO staffing requirement for units sourced for SC MAGTFs with personnel who hold micro-region assignments specific to the regions where they will operate. Trying to make assignments completely conditional on micro-region assignment is unrealistic, but a percentage should be achievable. Perhaps the solution is to make CMSRP assignments at the Basic School after duty stations have been designated, while making appointments at the Sergeants Course based on the NCO's current duty station.
This plan still preserves the original intent of the program by providing a diverse pool of regional experts across the greater Marine Corps. The CMRSP holds enormous potential for building greater understanding in our operating forces units, particularly those that source the SC MAGTF.
The next initiative could come through the assignment of foreign area officers (FAOs) and regional affairs officers (RAOs). FAOs have extensive experience in a foreign country, including proficiency in the language; RAOs have an accredited master's degree in the study of a country's political, social, and economic characteristics. Because the FAO/RAO military occupational specialty (MOS) is an additional one, it is not intended to be a primary job assignment. First and foremost, FAOs and RAOs need to maintain proficiency in their primary MOSs to remain competitive for advancement. Officers who seek to become FAOs or RAOs through a school-track process impose significant challenges on themselves for future competitiveness. If we provided them with opportunities to serve in primary MOS assignments in the operating forces, while also completing their required utilization tour, they would have better opportunities to maintain a viable career progression.
Currently, FAO and RAO assignments are billet-coded to only a limited number of tables of organization and are exclusively at higher headquarters. However, for units sourced for an SC MAGTF, access to FAOs and RAOs would be a tremendous force multiplier. Selected billets in these units could be FAO/RAO-coded.
When a billet line number on a table of organization is identified as appropriate for an additional MOS, it is identified as either necessary or desired. I propose that appropriate billets in operating-force units be coded as desired. This differentiation would give the monitor the flexibility to assign priority to an officer with both the primary and additional MOS over someone holding only the primary MOS. And the monitor's ability to fill the billets would not be limited.
Finally, we should vanquish the stigma of "homesteading" and actually encourage Marines to return to the same duty stations and even the same units they have previously served in. This proposal may draw criticism stemming from concerns about stovepiping professional development, but in my view, the priority should be to have personnel with previous regional experience, and even professional relationships with foreign military members. This is not to suggest that those who serve with SC MAGTF sourcing units should be forced to return. If they wish to serve in other units, they should be permitted to do so. But a seasoned NCO or officer with previous experience in training foreign security forces in a specific region is a tremendous asset to Marine Corps BPC efforts.
With recurrent unit rotation to the same area of operations and assignment of experienced personnel to units sourced for the SC MAGTFs, some of our multi-capable forces should be well positioned to meet the challenges of this emerging mission. Critics of regionalization certainly abound. The concept constitutes a fundamental paradigm shift involving steps that will challenge several conventionally held viewpoints.
Addressing the Critics
Regionalization does not reflect any changes in the training of units sourcing the SC MAGTF. Platoons will still conduct the basics of blocking and tackling. Companies will continue to integrate and coordinate platoon and section activities. And battalions and regiments will continue to integrate fire, maneuver, and logistics at their respective levels. The mission-essential task lists for these units will change very little.
Regionalization should not entail significant additional training. The specialists should provide the necessary expertise to effectively create and implement training programs. Substantial time should not be spent providing detailed environmental understanding to everyone. Most junior Marines will get that understanding from on-the-ground experience. Basic training courses in cultural awareness and security cooperation techniques should be provided by the Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning and the Security Cooperation Education Training Center, but seeking to make everyone an expert is both unachievable and unnecessary.
Some opponents express concern that by regularly rotating units to support the SC MAGTF, they will become less proficient in their warfighting skills. This fear is unsupported. The Marines who will be training and conducting BPC activities with our partner-nation security forces will have to be trainers and subject-matter experts on tactics themselves. This puts the onus on the small unit leaders to really know their stuff and be able to demonstrate their abilities and knowledge.
The tactics will probably not be that different—there are only so many ways to conduct an attack or organize a defense. Combined arms remains the best way to defeat an opponent and will be a cornerstone of any instruction that our Marines provide. The challenge will be in identifying the packaging and delivery of the training, and regional expertise will facilitate this.
Far from atrophying, the combat skills of these Marines should grow. Their proficiency, combined with their in-depth understanding of regional environmental factors, should result in the Marine Corps providing the combatant commanders with some of their most potent forces.
Finally, the criticism that regionalization will result in units that cannot be globally sourced is unfounded. Nothing about this concept will prevent units from being apportioned for planning or allocated to support major contingency operations as required. Those units that source the SC MAGTF can still be considered available for operations plans and contingencies, both within and outside of the geographic region in which they usually operate.
As the Corps conducts BPC activities that enable partner nations to effectively deal with internal security challenges, we can count on adversaries to continue challenging us. When this happens, it is simply a reflection of the complex security environment in which we live. Operations that require Marines to seize the initiative and dominate the enemy will invariably occur despite our best efforts to minimize them.
Regionalization will help Marines build experience in their assigned regions and enable them to fight smarter. If the Marine Corps Mid-Range Threat Assessment 2005-2015 is accurate, future conflicts will likely be in areas where the SC MAGTFs will be operating. This concept will provide our Corps with at least one ready brigade-size MAGTF that understands these regions and is optimized for operations there.
It is time to take a hard look at regionalization. The contemporary security environment differs greatly from that of the Cold War, yet we still organize and train our Marine forces as if we were facing a single conventional threat. Critics invariably cite the rise of near-peer competitors as a reason for continuing to organize in a manner that sees them as interchangeable pieces in a high-spectrum conflict such as the Korean War or Desert Storm.
Several near-peer competitors do appear to be on the rise, and we must be prepared for the possibility of military confrontation against a technologically comparable force. Our track record for predicting where and when we will fight has been remarkably poor. However, the probability of a high-intensity conventional conflict in the near future is significantly lower than that of crises in unstable regions from which irregular and hybrid threats emerge. Regionalization does not mean Marines will not be capable of activities across the full range of military operations. On the contrary, it will help our Corps to be truly multi-capable.
Some critics have gone so far as to maintain that if we take steps to optimize Marine forces for operations along the lower end of the operational scale, we risk losing resources programmatically over the program objective memorandum cycle. However, that argument is reversed. Funding and resources generally go to the programs that provide the most applicable solutions to the most proximate threats.
We need to organize, train, and equip our Corps in a more balanced manner to face the irregular opponent while still being capable of fighting and winning our nation's conventional battles. Failure to do so may mean money and force structure reductions—but more important, it means we will not be prepared when our nation needs us most. Regionalizing Marine forces is part of the solution. We should critically examine the initiatives proposed here, as well as others that we have not yet conceived or expressed. This will help us optimize our Corps to face the most likely threat.