From a naval perspective, perhaps the single most significant impact of global warming is the transformation of the Arctic from a forbidding, ice-blocked region usable almost exclusively by nuclear submarines, to a future set of sea routes and an important area of natural resources. The latter applies not only to the sea floor but also to the bordering land, which is nearly empty because the climate has been so brutal for much of the year. Now retreating ice and a warmer Arctic climate make it possible to envision the regular use of the passages around Canada and the Arctic coast of Alaska, and similarly around the northern coast of Russia—for North America, the fabled Northwest Passage sought unsuccessfully by so many explorers in the past.
Warming may also make the lands bordering the Arctic Ocean much more usable. For example, more of Canada’s population may choose to live in the north. For some years the Canadians have been talking about their “third coast” and have recently revived northern land patrols as a way of asserting sovereignty over their northern territories. A warming and more usable Arctic may also improve the status and economics of indigenous peoples such as the Alaskan Aleuts. The U.S. Coast Guard has been discussing the implications of global warming and a more open Arctic for Alaska.
The Arctic Ocean itself is relatively shallow (average depth is 3,281 feet, which means that many areas are much shallower; the average depth of the World Ocean is 12,454 feet). That is why in the past even submarine navigation carried considerable hazards, as a submarine could be caught between ice and the bottom. If it becomes more hospitable, shallow depth may make seabed mining or drilling for oil relatively easy. Most of the other accessible shallow sea areas are already being exploited. The Arctic seabed is untapped, except at its edges. No one can be sure of what resources, if any, lie under the Arctic Ocean, but there seems to be a general assumption that they are likely to be vast and valuable.
Russia Returns
In September, the Russians sought to cement their claims to the resources of the Arctic Ocean by steaming a group of warships, including their remaining nuclear-powered cruiser Petr Velikiy and two large amphibious ships, 1,500 nautical miles through the Barents and Kara Seas. The Russians described the operation as a demonstration of their legal right to the resources of the Arctic, a process that seems to have begun a few years ago when they planted a metal flag on the floor of the Arctic Ocean. The ships carried material to be used in reopening a Cold War-era Arctic air base on Kotelny Island in the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago. This archipelago was used regularly for nuclear tests, which the airfield presumably supported.
The Russian surface group was supported by all three of their operational nuclear-powered icebreakers. At present the Russians have by far the world’s largest fleet of icebreakers, including six with nuclear power, and they are building more. In addition there are nine large conventionally powered ocean icebreakers, and many smaller ones. The U.S. Coast Guard has three icebreakers, two of which are more than 30 years old, and procurement of replacements has been deferred due to projected cost. Canada has two large and four medium icebreakers, plus light icebreakers not suited to Arctic waters.
Many of the large Russian icebreakers were built during the Cold War, when the most important Arctic resource, in the former Soviet Union’s view, was the potential for military basing. Some of the nuclear icebreakers used the same reactors that were mass-produced for submarines. The Soviets’ Northern Fleet, based in the Western Arctic, was by far their most important. Some Soviet ballistic-missile submarines were conceived specifically to operate under Arctic ice, firing their missiles through the naturally occurring openings (polynyas). This practice was why the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy regularly practiced under-ice submarine operations.
The Russian announcement of the Arctic operation claimed that it was unprecedented, that at no time in the modern history of Russia had surface ships penetrated so far along the Northern Sea Route (the route between the Barents and the Pacific). However, the Russians officially opened the route in 1933, having set up a special administrative agency to oversee it, and in 1935 warships of the Baltic Fleet made the passage to strengthen Soviet Pacific forces during a crisis with Japan. In July-September 1940 the German commerce raider Komet passed from the Barents to the Pacific via the Bering Strait between the Soviet Union and Alaska. Soviet help was essential. The voyage was considered a remarkable feat at the time. Later the Arctic Sea Route, particularly its eastern end, was an important means of shipping prisoners into some of the bleakest parts of the Soviet Gulag system.
The Russians announced the September operation as a step toward maintaining their status as (in their view) the leading Arctic power, with a combination of vital security and economic interests in the region. They pointed to claims by other, non-Arctic, countries such as China, India, and Brazil (but did not mention more realistic claims by Canada and the United States). Of these, China most recently demonstrated interest in the Arctic in 2012 when its icebreaker Xue Long crossed the Arctic Ocean from the Bering Strait to Iceland and back. A second Chinese icebreaker is being built. Brazil has one polar scientific ship, but she is not equipped to break anything beyond thin ice. India is in the process of acquiring an icebreaker for polar research, and already has a floating ice research station in the Arctic.
China’s Interest
It seems odd that the Russians appear to have forgotten their previous use of the Northern Sea Route. If they do not believe they can operate freely along its full length, they may find it difficult to protect their sovereignty in the area. Their mention of China’s interest in the Arctic may imply a fear that at some point the Chinese will see the eastern end of the old Northern Sea Route as a means of outflanking Russian forces in eastern Siberia. The Russians are well aware that China needs more and more resources as it modernizes. Although some of those resources come from Russia (i.e., Siberia), the bulk come by sea. Indeed, some Chinese naval officers have argued publicly that China now depends so much on seaborne resources that it must have a navy capable of protecting that vital interest. It is not clear to what extent this argument has caused the Chinese government to invest in a fleet; the current upsurge in naval spending may merely be part of a larger program of military modernization.
If, however, the current programs do reflect an economic argument, then the ground forces are probably also looking for justification. They could argue that China must be prepared to defend its stake in Siberian resources. This could be justified in terms of the long-standing Chinese claim that tsarist Russia seized Siberia from Imperial China through a series of “unequal treaties” extending over several centuries. At one time many Chinese lived in what is now Siberia; the Russians ejected all of them. In the 1980s the Chinese wanted the Soviets to acknowledge their territorial sins, but they admitted that since no ethnic Chinese remained in Siberia, it was difficult to justify territorial demands. Now, however, large numbers of ethnic Chinese live there. If the climate keeps improving, more will probably move in, attracted by the open spaces available for farming.
Russia is gradually modernizing its forces, but it is doubtful that there is much money for new infrastructure. What existed at the end of the Cold War is what survives today; the revived airfield in the Arctic is a good example. Through the end of the Cold War, the Soviets invested heavily in the defense of Siberia against a possible Chinese attack, expected to come mainly overland, from the south. At the time the Chinese had little naval capability. The naval side of Siberian defense against China was mainly a matter of using naval forces to outflank Chinese ground units headed north. The Soviets invested heavily in air-cushion landing craft, which were often associated with the Far East. It is unlikely that much effort went into the defense of the Arctic coast of Siberia. Little was probably done in the way of road or rail connections from garrisons nearer the Pacific coast to areas farther north and west.
Right now the Arctic is still inhospitable enough that no one in Beijing is likely to contemplate moving troops up through the Bering Strait and onto the Arctic shore of Siberia. However, the situation is visibly changing. If that continues, the Russian Arctic shore will become a potential area of military operations, accessible to the amphibious ships the Chinese are building, which up to now have been associated with a possible assault on Taiwan. Even if the Chinese never mount an operation against Siberia, the sense that they have a growing capability to do so would, it seems, insure against any attempt by the Russians to use raw material supply to apply pressure as they have done against Europe using natural gas supplies.
At present Sino-Russian relations are said to be good. The Russians are continuing to sell China modern military hardware, although that trade is falling off as the Chinese develop their own alternatives. China has joined Russia in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (the other members are former Soviet republics Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan, and Uzhbekistan). In theory the organization coordinates both economic and military relations. Meetings of the Shanghai organization are sometimes used to announce Russian military initiatives, such as the decision to revive long-range bomber patrols toward NATO areas. The Chinese delegates have so far refrained from any impolite reminders of past Russian sins—but those may yet come.