The Battle for Hell’s Island: How a Small Band of Carrier Dive-Bombers Helped Save Guadalcanal
Stephen L. Moore. New York: New American Library, 2015. Illus. Photos. Biblio. Notes. Index. 498 pp. $27.95.
Reviewed by Thomas Wildenberg
On 7 August 1942 the U.S. Marines landed on Guadalcanal as the first step of an island-hopping campaign that would ultimately lead to the defeat of Japan. The fight for the island was a brutal battle of attrition that raged for months as the Japanese tried desperately to hold on to its strategic foothold. Much of the credit for the campaign’s success can be attributed to the pilots and gunners of the Navy’s Dauntless SBD dive bombers, who time and again prevented the Imperial Japanese Navy from reinforcing the Japanese forces on the beleaguered island. This is the primary theme of Stephen Moore’s book, The Battle for Hell’s Island: How a Small Band of Carrier Dive-Bombers Helped Save Guadalcanal.
The book provides a detailed account of the Navy’s dive-bomber pilots from mid-1941 through the first few months of 1943. Although a major portion of the text revolves around the events surrounding Guadalcanal, dubbed “Hell’s Island” by those who served there, almost half of the book is devoted to the events and actions leading up to the battle. Moore begins by describing the background and training of the pilots assigned to Scouting Squadron 2 (VS-2) and Bombing Squadron 2 (VB-2) assigned to the aircraft carrier Lexington (CV-2). He continues with accounts of the early carrier raids and the Battle of the Coral Sea, focusing on the biographical backgrounds of the pilots and gunners of the SBDs that participated in these battles and the aerial engagements in which they took part. For some inexplicable reason he glosses over the Battle of Midway, devoting less than two pages to this crucial clash.
The book is well written with a skillful use of prose. Moore, a talented writer, conveys a lot of information without overburdening the reader and holds attention so that one wants to keep turning the pages. Moore is at his best when retelling the aerial encounters and bombing attacks of the SBD pilots and their rear-seat gunners. Regrettably, the incessant, and sometimes unnecessary, insertion of biographical, background, and the romantic history of the various participants in these actions often disrupts what would otherwise have been a very enjoyable narrative. The author would have been better served if he had chosen to focus on a few key players instead of trying to provide the background on each and every pilot and gunner mentioned.
The material in this book has been meticulously and thoroughly researched as indicated by the large number of interviews conducted by the author and the extensive list of bibliographic references. It is well illustrated with photographs, illustrations, and maps. Moore also includes detailed tables listing the organization and aircrew assignments for just about every action described in the book. He records every aircraft accident or crash along with the personnel lost. This information, never publicized before, provides new insights into the dangers faced by the Navy’s pilots during this era. The large number of casualties due to crashes and ditchings not related to combat is striking.
The book is not without shortcomings, however. Moore glosses over the fogging problems of the dive-bombing sights, doesn’t tell us very much about the SBD’s flight characteristics or its stability as a dive-bombing platform, and has little to say about the type of bombs carried or their effectiveness against carrier flight decks, parked aircraft, or ground targets. While he goes into great detail about Medal of Honor recipient Lieutenant (junior grade) William E. Hall, he neglects to provide the citation that went along with the award and leaves us guessing why it was given.
Aviation buffs interested in learning more about the details of the aerial combat, dive-bombing, and the experiences of pilots and gunners will get the most out of this book. The Battle for Hell’s Island will also appeal to those students of naval history who are already knowledgeable about the early carrier raids and the struggle for Guadalcanal, but would like to know more details of the dive-bombing attacks conducted during this time period and the aircrews performing them. I would not recommend it for those who are not familiar with carrier aviation during this period of World War II or the general aspects of the Guadalcanal campaign.
Mr. Wildenberg is an independent historian/scholar specializing in the development of naval aviation and technological innovation in the Navy. His most recent work, published by the Naval Institute Press, is Striking the Hornet’s Nest: Naval Aviation and the Origins of Strategic Bombing in World War I.
The Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare: How Churchill’s Secret Warriors Set Europe Ablaze and Gave Birth to Modern Black Ops
Damien Lewis. New York: Quercus, 2015. Maps. Biblio. Append. Index. 402 pp. $24.99.
Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin F. Jones, U.S. Air Force (Retired)
In the past two decades, there have been a number of well-done books on the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the beginnings of modern special operations. While well written and a good read, The Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare wants to be too much like Ian Fleming and James Bond, and this proves to be a weakness.
Winston Churchill founded the SOE to take the fight to the Germans on the continent of Europe when his regular army was too battered to conduct any large-scale operations. The SOE was intended to be the organization that kept the British involved in combat against the Germans and linked them to the resistance organizations in occupied Europe. In Churchill’s dramatic phrase, the SOE was to “set Europe ablaze.” One of the SOE’s members was a young Ian Fleming, who later wrote the James Bond novels, and was inspired by what he saw and experienced during World War II. It seems that Lewis wishes to channel Fleming, often reaching for Bond-esque terms to describe things. Regrettably, this casts things not as they were, but as Lewis imagines Fleming might describe them. Lewis credits his researcher for going through the British National Archives and the Imperial War Museum Records, but there are no notes, so readers serious about learning more are left to wonder where specific information came from.
However, the book does provide a close up and well-written description of some of the early operations of the SOE and the founding members of the British commando units, British Special Air Service (SAS), and Special Boat Service. Readers interested in the U.S. Navy SEAL teams and their British equivalent can find some useful things about four key pioneers of this kind of warfare: Gus March-Phillipps, Geoffrey Appleyard, Graham Hayes, and Anders Lassen are decorated SAS legends, and their exploits make up the main narrative. These men are worth knowing more about. One can learn how tensions appeared immediately between Churchill’s SOE and the regular forces regarding everything from recruiting to knife fighting.
Lewis’ pages convey other tenets and principles of special operations. Deception, calculation, cunning, dedication to the mission, physical courage, careful planning, innovation and imagination when the plan goes wrong, and the reliance on local forces—all while having to deal with the distrust and political backstabbing from higher headquarters—are not new. Indeed, they are part and parcel of modern special operations. The Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare also discusses how Lassen, March-Phillipps, Appleyard, and Hayes used unexpected offers of support to fill needs—such as when the regular army disapproved of supporting a mission in Nigeria, but a sympathetic British colonial official came through with local forces to fill out the roster. Lewis describes the major operations undertaken by the SOE in Africa, Crete, the Aegean Sea, and northern Italy, and solidly links the purpose of these missions to the wider war.
Historians of this topic will see little new here except for the valuable personal stories. The military professional might find this a good beginning on the SAS, SOE, or World War II’s commandos. But other works are more historically clear and less of an overt nod to James Bond. While Lewis’ work does help characterize the legacy of the people who fought in the SOE commando units, this ultimately distracts from the amazing things these men did and how they did it.
Lieutenant Colonel Jones served in the U.S. Air Force in various capacities including as faculty in the Air Force Academy Department of History from 1999–02 and from 2008–13. He received his PhD In history from the University of Kansas and his book Eisenhower’s Guerrillas: The Jedburghs, the Maquis, and the Liberation of France (Oxford University Press) will be out this month.
Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future
Henry Sokolski. Arlington, Virginia: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 2015. 137 pp. Free download.
Reviewed by Lieutenant Matthew D. Rautio, U.S. Navy
Henry Sokolski, a frequent advisor to Congress and a Reagan-era defense official, builds on the nonproliferation assessment and theoretical frameworks of authors such as Jacques Hymans in his latest book, Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future. “The next arms race will be run by a much larger number of contestants with highly destructive strategic capabilities . . . than in any other previous period in history,” he concludes. He warns that this scenario will unfold in the next two decades. An examination of his argument and the evidence he cites suggest that he is actually saying what few want to admit: The next race is already under way.
For observers of international nuclear negotiations, Underestimated seeks to explain the rationale behind nonproliferation policies and their chronically weak enforcement. Sokolski expands his scope from the historic effects of proliferation on global order to address the broader implications of a fully proliferated world populated by growing nuclear stockpiles. This book builds on his previous writing about the failure of international and U.S. nonproliferation policies. In addition to being readily accessible to the layman, Sokolski’s succinct examination of this problem reminds experts and policymakers that the deferred costs of proliferation are mounting and will eventually become real threats.
The author uses open-source material that leaves readers with the feeling they have stumbled on classified documents. The pages are peppered with eye-opening statistics—no security clearance required. Students of proliferation will find that Sokolski’s footnotes serve as an extensive guide to a wealth of declassified primary sources. He walks the reader through the leading theories on nuclear proliferation to support his view that nonproliferation policy development and enforcement should be a top priority for U.S. and international security.
According to Sokolski, a proliferated world creates unacceptable risks that nuclear weapons will be used. He does not accept the premise that in a decentralized international-relations structure, additional proliferation equates to greater security. He warns against agreements that allow states such as North Korea and Iran to acquire technologies that support future nuclear options. The Nonproliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), he warns, are not enough to stem the tide of nuclear hedging.
Possibly the greatest contribution of this book comes from Sokolski’s attack on the overly optimistic (and prevalent) view that the nuclear problem is only relevant to deterrence and political bargaining, and is therefore not a real threat. But he is less interested in theory than practical solutions. Sokolski constructs his argument in a way that caters to policymakers by providing realistic recommendations rather than theoretical ones. He defines the problem, what the U.S. government is doing about it, the current trajectory, and recommendations to reshape that trajectory.
Underestimated provides three valid, and specific, recommendations for U.S. policymakers and international agencies for the way ahead: 1) Clarify China’s capabilities and its commitment to nonproliferation and arms-control measures; 2) Get a tighter grip on the export of “peaceful” nuclear energy materials and push to make the IAEA more effective; and 3) Anticipate and take the necessary steps to ward off nuclear proliferation before it becomes a crisis. The third point clearly illustrates how non and counter proliferation often merge. The author effectively displays how new norms might be established through various treaties (Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, Nonproliferation Treaty, Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty) and possibly enforced by the IAEA and enhanced state cooperation.
Sokolski does not focus on possible deterrent activities that states could employ further upstream of crisis to rally opposition to and generate threat assessments for states that could be threatened by proliferation and hedging. A fourth recommendation might have been to address the lack of institutionalized education tracks within the U.S. and other governments for decision makers. Increased education for government leaders early in their careers could serve to further inform future policy and aid in identifying over-the-horizon threats resulting from nuclear, chemical, biological, and other emerging technology in an age of globalization. Proliferation is not a new threat, nor is it likely to subside.
This important work is particularly timely given the ineffectual negotiations with Iran, the continued development of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons by Russia, the deployments of tactical nuclear weapons by Pakistan, and the increasing threat of nuclear capability by non-state actors. For every answer proposed, more questions emerge for those informed on dirty bombs, source identification, and potential responses to nuclear aggression.
Perhaps one measure of successful authorship is leaving the reader wanting more. In that regard, Sokolski makes good: As executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, he routinely publishes articles relevant to ongoing nuclear developments in the international community and looks to continue providing no-nonsense advice to policymakers and citizens alike. Hopefully a new generation of experts will pick up where he leaves off.
Lieutenant Rautio holds an MBA from the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School and is currently earning his MS through the Defense Analysis Department. He recently completed an interdisciplinary capstone aimed at improving U.S. interagency collaboration to more effectively counter weapons of mass destruction.