In June, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) published their report of the causal factors that led to the fatal USS John S. McCain (DDG-56) collision in 2017. The investigation identified the mishap’s cause as, “insufficient training and inadequate bridge operating procedures.” Although the helmsman and lee helmsmen had completed the required personnel qualification standard (PQS) packet and were qualified to stand the watch, they—and other members of McCain’s bridge team—were unfamiliar with the operation of the complicated touch-screen helm station. The NTSB found that the McCain helmsmen were not proficient in all operations of the helm and made note that the ship’s helm and lee helm PQS did not cover transferring thrust or steering between all bridge stations. The Board recommended the Navy “revise the training standards for helmsman, lee helmsman, and [Boatswain Mates of the Watch] for destroyers equipped with the [helm] to require demonstrated proficiency in all system functions.”
Demonstrated proficiency implies a reasonable degree of competence acquired through training; completion of shipboard PQS alone does not achieve this level of confidence. The alarming trend of shipboard mishaps suggest that PQS for afloat units is no longer an effective training program. PQS is intended to give a trainee a minimal level of proficiency through the completion of an intensive list of tasks performed by the trainee under the watchful eye of a qualified watchstander. However, the actual practice of completing PQS on board Navy ships and Coast Guard cutters is far less intense. Often a mere discussion of the practical factors, between qualified watchstander and trainee, will earn an evaluator’s signature. Over time, this half-hearted approach to “signing off” PQS has eroded the integrity of the on-the-job training system and degraded a well-intentioned training program into yet another administrative task to complete.
Naval operators have bemoaned the PQS program since its inception. In a 1977 Proceedings article, Commander Robert Mumford argued that in the Navy, “[administrative] procedures are stressed to the exclusion of substance” and offered while “PQS [has] merit” it “does not necessarily achieve a goal.” That goal, he explains, is “whether or not a man knows his job.” In 1988, Navy Lieutenant L.P. James observed, “the requirements for a PQS signature (denoting command of the specific task) vary greatly, and a signature may denote anything from the actual performance of a task to merely an explanation by a qualified officer.” And in 1996, Coast Guard Ensign Charles Cinamella claimed that pressure to qualify in a watch station led cuttermen to “fall into the just-get-it-signed-off-mode with regard to PQS.”
The PQS program exists because it’s a risk management control. The basic PQS approach is sound, rigorous, based in the theory of learning, and designed to certify prospective watchstanders to a minimum level of competence prior to performing specific duties. Most PQS follow a basic progression which starts with gaining specific knowledge, using that knowledge to understand how the major working parts of the system interact, and then demonstrating to an evaluator how to practically operate the system. PQS language acknowledges that performance enables the best learning and is always preferable to observation or discussion. Yet there are weaknesses in this training system designed to be rigorous. These weaknesses include:
- Lack of rigor in the selection of or validation of competence of qualifiers. Typically, anyone qualified in a watchstation can serve as an evaluator on that watchstation’s PQS. Non-rates sign PQS factors.
- Lack of understanding by leaders and qualifiers regarding the intent and design of the PQS process. PQS is a training system mandated by the Navy but managed by individual ships each with a collateral duty training officer, likely a junior officer, swamped with other collaterals. The crewmembers who sign PQS are those who implement—or discount—the program. Yet these crewmembers do not recognize the weight of their responsibility: their signature on PQS is a legal position of accountability which holds them culpable. The chief boatswain’s mate responsible for training McCain’s helmsmen and awarded punishment at courts martial did not. And why would he? Nothing in a PQS packet discusses a signatory’s liability, responsibility, or accountability in assessment of performance.
- Inadequate PQS tailoring including failure to add line items, inappropriate deletions, or improper department head or commanding officer validation and approval. PQS is an administrative burden on ship personnel; each ship alteration should trigger a review and update of shipboard PQS, but this does not always happen.
- Perceived pressure on qualifiers and trainees to certify requirements resulting from insufficient manning, high operational tempo, excessive workload, or the assignment of qualification “curves” which fail to account for these factors. Let us consider the incentive for a non-rate in a port-starboard rotation who has the authority to “sign off” PQS to qualify a new watchstander. The faster he “trains” his relief, the faster is own quality of life improves.
- Normalized deviance resulting from perception that PQS requirements are unimportant or not applicable, the process is administratively cumbersome, or the requirements do not make sense. Quartermaster of the watch PQS requires the trainee to plot a sunline, a task which might perplex even the qualified watchstander. Since the qualified watchstander never plots sunlines in his day-to-day routine, he likely signs the practical factor after “describing” how the task is not necessary for the job. Likewise, Coast Guard deck watch officer (DWO) PQS requires all trainees to conn into an anchorage, get underway from anchorage, and then observe an anchorage from the foc’sle. Three anchoring evolutions are required for each trainee DWO, often assigned to ships that rarely anchor. Reason and history indicate that no commanding officer will let a new DWO with little or no experience conn the ship to anchor without a coach. If an unqualified DWO is otherwise “ready” to pass a board but has not completed his requisite anchoring evolutions, those line items will likely get “signed off” after a discussion about anchoring.
For decades, operators have warned the Navy about these limitations of PQS and have offered solutions. Mumford advocated for practical exams and demonstrated knowledge tests, in lieu of paperwork checks, during inspections. James argued to create more time for training, reduce administrative responsibilities, and change the emphasis on collateral duties. Cinamella supported the Coast Guard Academy’s idea to require a minimum number of days underway as a graduation requirement for cadets—"in order to complete written portions of the PQS.” And in 2016, retired commander Royal Connell advocated for trainees to practice their craft on simulators or actual ships devoted solely to hands-on training without the distraction of operations or collateral duties. Additionally, PQS language should include discussion of the signatory’s responsibility, liability, and accountability, and those in leadership roles on board the ship must prioritize a face-to-face discussion regarding these responsibilities with persons they select and certify to be PQS qualifiers.
Elements of shipboard training are improving. In 2016, the Coast Guard Academy established a program for cadets to graduate with a Master of Less than 100 gross register tons, near coastal professional maritime credential; achievement requires 150 days of sea service on self-propelled vessels (40 days underway on cutters), successful passing of a professional exam in addition to the Rules-of-the-Road test, and a commission as an ensign. In 2017, the Navy tested a shiphandling-intensive JOOD course for ensigns following their Basic Division Officer Course, which will soon become the OOD phase 1 course. And the Office of Cutter Forces has made smart changes to streamline Coast Guard PQS over the years. They have also provided the cutter fleet with study materials for standardization. Still, the PQS system remains a checklist completed by watchstanders with mixed ownership of the program.
The PQS training method is “antiquated,” said Connell, for “[t]oday’s surface ship is no less complex a weapon system than a submarine or aircraft.” But, aviation and nuclear communities use PQS, and their systems work. They work because these communities recognize mishaps have a high cost of outcome and, in turn, impose heavy administrative controls on all facets of their organizations, including the assignments of qualifiers and the management of their applicable PQS and certification process. Plus, pilots and nukes arrive to their units already qualified in their primary duties, unlike SWOs who must balance collaterals, their divisional responsibilities, and become fully qualified in multiple watchstations in limited time. Yet the surface community continues to depend on PQS as the sole shipboard watchstander training program for non-Academy ensigns and most crew. This program needed a course adjustment 40 years ago. Today it is way off track and inches from shoal.