As the Navy approaches the projected deployment of multiple littoral combat ships to at least two different theaters, many question why so few LCS units are forward deployed, despite being in commission for more than ten years. However, very few critics of LCS have demonstrated an understanding of the timeline of the LCS program from the early 2000s to the present. Many want to measure LCS success or failure based on the number of traditional deployments completed. The Navy has made a number of attempts to explain the process of how LCS was developed and why until recently it was not managed as a traditional surface combatant program. These attempts seem to go unheard by too many critics who continue to misinform the general public about the LCS program.
Not the Usual Ship Build
LCS was established as a program of record in 2003, but the first two ships were constructed with significant research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) monies vice regular acquisition funding. A 2014 RAND Corporation report on ship acquisition policies noted that while the first ship in a class uses some RDT&E funding, most funding comes from standard ship conversion accounts. That report also noted that in the DoD acquisition system, ships usually are not declared official programs until milestone B, a point in the acquisition process where technology is more mature. LCS was granted program status at milestone A, a point before extensive development and testing. This highlights the experimental nature of the LCS program from its origin and suggests the construction of the first two LCS units was not a regular defense program.
There were challenges in the experimentation process. The USS Freedom (LCS-1) was laid down in June 2005 and commissioned in November 2008. The USS Independence (LCS-2) was laid down in January 2006 and commissioned in January 2010. The combination of new equipment, different hull forms, and a new engineering plant contributed to cost growth in the initial units. In addition, the surface warfare community’s demands during production for greater “survivability” caused significant design changes. The Navy instructed the two LCS shipyards to shift from commercial to naval standards in the midst of the construction of the first two units, thus further contributing to cost increases. Both LCS shipyards (the Freedom LCS variant is built in Marinette, Wisconsin, and the Independence variant in Mobile, Alabama) also had very little recent naval shipbuilding experience when they began construction. Following significant cost increases in both initial units, in 2007 the Navy canceled the original two follow-on units (LCS-3 and LCS-4).
After a nearly two-year pause and more program delays, in spring 2009, the Navy reintroduced the LCS program. Yet, the USS Fort Worth (LCS-3) was not commissioned until September 2012, and the next Independence variant, the USS Coronado (LCS-4), was not in active service until April 2014. Only now has the LCS fleet increased to 18 ships. Of these, the first four units were designated CONUS-based development units for new LCS equipment, leaving only 14 ships available for deployment. Of those, the USS Milwaukee (LCS-5) and the USS Jackson (LCS-6) were subjected to shock trials that interrupted their path to deployment. And the more recently commissioned ships are still in the year-long, post-shakedown availability and training period needed before being ready to deploy.
To date, the Navy has deployed both LCS variants, and multiship deployments are the next step. The Navy now has enough LCS units to deploy both variants to at least two different geographic areas. And while the training and certification of enough crews to fulfill a rotational cycle for multiple forward-deployed ships took more time than anticipated, the program is now seen as a model in terms of quality.
A Different Concept of Operations
One of the Navy’s primary intentions for the LCS program was to achieve a high percentage of forward-deployed ships. The traditional surface navy requires three to five ships actively in training, under repair, or in transit to forward locations to achieve the goal of one deployed ship. LCS was intended to substantially improve this ratio with rotational crews that would support keeping LCS units deployed for up to 18 months. This system also would reduce the number of transoceanic sailings to and from deployed locations, as these voyages put extensive wear on a ship.
The Navy chose not to permanently add LCS units to established forward-deployed hubs in Yokosuka and Sasebo, Japan, or Rota, Spain, because this would require more family housing, medical facilities, school space, and other costly support services. In addition, status-of-forces agreements with Japan and Spain would need to be revised to increase the number of U.S. military personnel and dependents. The rotational crew system avoids these costs and the need for a new round of diplomatic negotiations.
The 3-2-1 Challenges
The Navy had intended to operate LCS under a “3-2-1” crewing construct where three crews manned two ships. One crew would be on the ship, one would be in training to take over the ship, and a third would be in a post deployment period of more comprehensive training and rest. Unfortunately, the Navy never got a chance to test this system. The 3-2-1 crewing concept was discarded in September 2016 in the wake of material casualties on the deployed Fort Worth and the brand-new Milwaukee. The Fort Worth’s crew misaligned the ship’s combining gear system, and the Milwaukee had a software casualty that caused a loss of ship’s propulsion. The Fort Worth’s accident may have convinced the Navy that three crews for two ships was too difficult a goal. The lack of a dedicated, shore-based LCS engineering training site until 2016–17 may also have played a role in those equipment casualties and in some continuing challenges.
The Navy has now adopted a two-crew (blue/gold) model similar to the ballistic missile submarine force. A 2007 Congressional Budget Office assessment concluded that while a blue/gold model would likely cost more than a 3-2-1 crewing construct, it still would be less expensive than building the number of ships required to maintain the same number of forward-deployed units under a single-crew construct. While the Navy should perhaps not have discarded 3-2-1 so quickly, it still can save money with a two-crew construct. The Navy must have enough crews to support deploying multiple LCS units for a full 18-month deployment cycle. The recent deployment of the USS Montgomery (LCS-8) and the expected deployments of the USS Gabrielle Giffords (LCS-10), USS Detroit (LCS-7), and USS Little Rock (LCS-9) later this year and into early 2020 suggest that the Navy has now met the crew requirements for multiple LCS deployments to more than one geographic location.
Making Sense of the LCS Timeline
The two-year pause in the LCS program; the delays from changes in the ship’s design, crewing, and concept of operations; the shock trials for two ships that would have deployed; and delays, poor funding for, and excessive testing of mission-module equipment have combined to delay LCS overseas deployments. However, there is evidence to suggest the LCS program has not been as troubled as many have claimed. In a recent Congressional Research Service report, veteran naval analyst Ron O’Rourke suggested the LCS program could be viewed as very successful at fielding a new capability in a short time. He states that the LCS program “demonstrated that reducing acquisition cycle time can be done.” The report also states that LCS offered no real lessons for naval shipbuilding since it was radically different from previous shipbuilding efforts.
Modern warships are expensive, complex pieces of military hardware. They cannot be both inexpensive and highly survivable in modern combat that features super-hypersonic antiship cruise missiles, heavyweight guided torpedoes, and smart mines. The same naval traditionalists, engineers, and members of Congress who now condemn LCS are, in some measure, responsible for the LCS’s high costs and delayed timeline because of their demands for more lethality and survivability. Not every ship can be a fortress at sea. Separating the LCS “sea frame” from modular capabilities was intended to keep costs lower by removing unneeded systems and associated crew when not required for a mission. Sadly, this process has now come full circle, with an LCS whose modules and associated crew are permanent installations rather than swappable capabilities.
LCS critics should take a step back and accurately review the construction timeline before making uninformed and often outlandish statements about the length of time it has taken to deploy the ships and under what deployment scheme they should operate.