Submarines Will Reign in a War with China
The author cited an article from 34 years ago to set up a straw man: To wit, John Lehman wrongly advocated for carriers versus submarines (especially guided-missile subs) that will emerge as the primary weapon vs. China. In actuality, last August, John and I wrote in National Review:
America’s defeat is not predestined. China must attack across one hundred miles of open ocean, while our Navy can detect the movement of any warship, submarine, or plane. Thousands of antiship missiles await the invasion craft. . . . Nor can China rationally expand a naval clash with America. Its entire economy depends on imports across oceans controlled by America’s attack submarines, aircraft, and surface forces. Our Navy must exude confidence in its lethal mission to sink the enemy, and visibly exercise and train to do it.
Note that we emphasized equally “attack submarines, aircraft, and surface forces.” We did not advocate one platform versus another. Our point was that conflict in the Taiwan Strait is but one battle in a war against China. China’s vulnerability is that it cannot sustain a war because we, with our aircraft and submarines, control all the oceans. That is what our Navy should plainly state, forcing the Chinese to understand that the locus of war will not be chosen by them.
—Bing West
I am a U.S. submarine enthusiast. Both of my uncles worked on the USS Nautilus (SSN-571). U.S. ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) are the most survivable nuclear deterrent, and nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) are the best way to defeat an enemy’s SSBNs. However, war with China can take many forms, and the most likely war is a Chinese invasion of Taiwan that employs 25,000 ships. (The D-Day invasion at Normandy used 7,000.) In such a war, U.S. submarines are not going to reign or even be a large factor in defeating such an invasion attempt. We need to be thinking about how to sink 25,000 ships in one day with more than just our excellent SSBNs and SSNs.
—William Thayer
Ship Class Designations Have Meaning
Mr. Frankston’s recommendation is outstanding. I hope the Naval Institute can raise awareness among more people—Pentagon or Capitol Hill staff—about this article. Frankston’s recommendations are logical and would help with some of the discussion about naval force construction. Certainly, his ideas add clarity. Thank you for publishing it.
—RADM James J. Shannon, USN (Ret.)
Bigger Fleets Win
Captain Tangredi’s main argument is based on an unstated premise that, should a U.S.-China conflict occur, the U.S. Navy and the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) would be the only two navies participating. It is important to remember that any such war would not be a strictly U.S.-China bout. The conflict would occur within an ecosystem of states, each of which has its own interests at stake.
There are at least two other states that share an interest in checking China’s aggressive bid for hegemony in the western Pacific. Both Japan and Australia are freedom-loving, advanced democracies that stand to lose perhaps even more than the United States with further Chinese expansion. Since the early 20th century, with few exceptions, the United States has chosen to fight its wars in consultation with and in cooperation with its allies. And the reason goes beyond morals and ideals—it is clear political and economic sense.
Taking at face value Captain Tangredi’s thesis that more ships (whatever the class) would win a war, remembering these other players immediately improves the outlook. Even discounting India, one of the four members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, 115 ships from Japan and 40 from Australia would put a U.S. coalition at just about an even footing with China.
The article’s most alarming feature is not the U.S. Navy’s numerical ship deficit compared with the PLAN—it is the thought that the United States, mesmerized by the “great power” mantra, might forget its smaller partner nations, who were vital to its rise as a world power, and who will remain vital to ensuring its freedom and security into the future.
—LCDR Andrew Mueller, USN
I agree completely with the thrust of Captain Tangredi’s article. Fleet size will have a decisive effect on the outcome of any great naval war with China. However, I do not believe the math adds up in quite the way he presented it.
China has approximately 350 warships and is trending toward 400. The United States should be concerned by the continued growth of the world’s biggest navy. But though the U.S. warship total remains near but under 300, the United States has the world’s largest network of defense alliances. If our primary concern is simply the total number of ships at war, then with some quick web searches and a back-of-the-napkin calculation, we can substantially update our side of the ledger.
NATO alone boasts about 2,050 ships (including, of course, the U.S. total). The Australia, New Zealand, and U.S. (ANZUS) mutual-defense pact would add another 50 or so. Our oldest ally in the region, the Philippines (with whom we signed a mutual-defense pact two days before ANZUS), can contribute 80 ships. The modern, formidable Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force numbers (depending on definition) about 115 ships, while the Republic of Korea supplies 140. This brings the total number of ships bound by treaty to fight alongside the United States to more than 2,400.
The United States also has security partnerships with other countries such as Singapore, Thailand, India, and Indonesia, with a combined warship force totaling about 500. While these countries are not under treaty obligation to fight on behalf of a U.S. war effort, one hopes they might at least contribute to securing certain sea lanes or strategic bodies of water. For those who have little faith in the promises of allies, I would note that many of these friends spent the past 20 years in the desert alongside us. The Germans, Italians, and British had sizeable contingents on the ground calling in airstrikes through the bitter end as the Taliban surged toward Kabul.
China, on the other hand, has no stated binding treaty obligations with any country except perhaps Russia, depending on the true scope of its “limitless friendship.” Russia could support China with a sizable 290 warships, but given its general military performance in Ukraine, China may not find much comfort in that.
Analysts can quibble with the exact numbers and quality of the warships each country can bring to the fight. Not every warship counted on the allied side is an Arleigh Burke–class destroyer, but neither is every one of China’s ships a Renhai cruiser (it has only four). If indeed bigger fleets win, it is China that needs to worry about the arithmetic.
—LCDR Jeff Zeberlein, USN
Launch Big Missiles from Big Ships
Commander Fox and Lieutenant Commander Phillips-Levine’s perspective is representative of how many people view the prospect of combat against China: the U.S. Navy going it alone. What happened to the Air Force? Hasn’t “jointness” been a primary war-fighting driver at the Pentagon for several decades?
It is easy to see the benefit and effectiveness of large numbers of B-52s, each capable of launching Harpoon, AGM-86C air-launched cruise, and long-range antiship missiles against land-based targets and surface ships from standoff range. And in the latter half of this decade, extremely stealthy B-21s will become available to employ these weapons and many others.
In fact, B-21s may become a key system in defeating elements of China’s antiaccess/area-denial defenses in and around the South China Sea, after which U.S. strike groups can be moved farther forward to the first island chain to attack targets and support Taiwan.
The nation will be best served with a team effort.
—Kevin A. Capps
Just-in-Time Production
It is interesting when two articles in the same issue complement each other: Captain Tangredi’s and Commander Wright’s say roughly the same thing in different ways. The bigger the initial fleet, the more losses a nation can absorb and keep fighting. When World War II Japan lost its main carriers (as well as their highly trained crews and airmen), there were few carriers in reserve to continue the fight in the Pacific on its terms.
Building a warship (of whatever type) takes time, resources, and modular construction. Henry Kaiser’s shipyards in Portland, Oregon, built 322 Liberty ships, 99 Victory ships, 33 attack transports, 147 T2 tankers, 50 escort aircraft carriers, and other craft for World War II.
The landing craft and PT boats built by Andrew Jackson Higgins’ shipyards in Louisiana were almost all of modular construction, with the parts coming from all over the United States and fitted together in the shipyards. It did not take them five years to build a warship.
—C. Henry Depew
Commander Wright notes that “once awaked by the sneak attack at Pearl Harbor, U.S. industrial might built an unstoppable juggernaut that steamrolled an outmatched enemy.” The U.S. industrial response to the war preceded the attack on Pearl Harbor. President Franklin Roosevelt set mobilization in motion 18 months earlier. In the spring of 1940, following the German invasion of the lowlands, FDR set his famous production goal of 50,000 military airplanes a year. To see this happen, he turned to Detroit and drafted the president of General Motors Corporation, William Knudsen, to mobilize American industry for a potential war. The Two-Ocean Navy Act of 1940 spurred the mobilization effort.
The managerial talent of the auto industry’s managers transformed U.S. armament manufacturing. By November 1941, before Pearl Harbor, the United States had built the factories, production had started, and the result was a virtual avalanche of weapons. The Ford Motor Company’s Willow Run Bomber Plant was the manifestation of the production miracle. It would produce one four-engine bomber per hour by 1944.
Production would not peak for another two years, but if mobilization had not started in the spring of 1940, the response to Pearl Harbor would have been much different.
—CAPT Ralph Hotton, USN (Ret.)
Recruiting Requires Bold Changes
Serving in the U.S. armed forces is an honor and a privilege, quite challenging and rewarding at the same time. And yet, serving in the military seems to be the furthest thing from the minds of young Americans today.
Much has been said and written about the ongoing issues in meeting military recruiting goals in the past few years. Articles, case studies, and research show that there has been a steady decline in interest or desire to serve in the military and our government in general.
General Berger wrote, “Recruiting challenges in a single service affect the whole force, and when those challenges are endemic across every service—as they are today—the effects are magnified. They impact the ability of the joint force to fight and defend our nation.”
I am a retired commissioned officer who started in the enlisted ranks. My Navy experience taught me to be relentless, focused, creative, and innovative in the face of challenges and difficulties. More important, my service gave me education, training, travel, lifelong camaraderie, and lots of opportunities that continue to benefit me and my family to this day.
This is why I continue to encourage people (as much as I can) to serve, too. I have often said that the armed services and the federal government, in general, are always looking for good people—so why should we not encourage our children? It is a noble cause, morally righteous and absolutely necessary. In fact, both my daughters are currently serving, one in the Navy and the other in the Air Force. I have helped the children of friends join the active and reserve components of the Navy as well.
As veterans, leaders, and concerned citizens, it is our solemn responsibility to take it upon ourselves and do everything within our power to encourage people to serve. A continuum of service is critical in keeping and maintaining our way of life. It is our duty to ensure our knowledge and personal insights into the rewards, benefits, and satisfaction of military service are passed to the next generation, who will carry on our important work. Mentoring and educating the next generation of military recruits and leaders is key to sustaining the continuum of service necessary for our society to succeed and thrive against our adversaries.
—Lieutenant Joel Dimaapi, USN (Ret.)
Lieutenant Colonel Kerg’s story was eye-opening.
I enlisted in the Navy in 1986, when Ronald Reagan was the commander-in-chief. The article reminded me of what the President said in 1980: “We know only too well that war comes not when the forces of freedom are strong, but when they are weak. It is then that tyrants are tempted.” This is exactly what Lieutenant Colonel Kerg was getting at.
The changes in our military, especially our Navy and Marine Corps, seem to be more about social manipulation rather than building a warfighting force. While I have been out of the Navy for some time, I have several recently retired shipmates (both officer and enlisted). All of them said the changes in the forces have not made us stronger, only weaker.
I hope our senior commanders take this to heart and start a turnaround. My fear is China will strike and we will send unprepared and inadequately trained sailors and Marines into battle, and losses will be heavy. I hope we are not so far down the changing road that we cannot come back.
—Todd A Voge
Has the Time Come for Midget Submarines?
My thanks to Lieutenant Commander Blanton for remembering two distinguished Italian Navy World War I heroes. I would like to add a few comments and corrections.
Their names were Raffaele Rossetti and Raffaele Paolucci di Valmaggiore. Both were lieutenant commanders in the Naval Engineers Corps of the Royal Italian Navy, but Rossetti was chosen to lead the Pola attack. Their target was the Austro-Hungarian dreadnought Viribus Unitis, not Vibrus. [Editor’s note: due to an editing error, the ship and officers’ first names were incorrectly spelled.]
Both were taken prisoner after the attack, then freed four days later, when the navy sent a landing force to Pola. Both were awarded the Italian Gold Medal for Military Valor, and Paolucci also received the U.S. Naval Distinguished Service Medal. It is likely Rossetti did, too, but I could not find any record of it.
—Giovanni Manfredi
Navigate Your Department Head Tour with Confidence and Humility
Captain Sullivan’s excellent contribution to the February Leadership Forum, while focused on the surface navy, is relevant reading for leaders in all warfare communities. In addition, her arguments in favor of self-confidence, initiative, and humility should resonate with readers outside of department head tours and active duty.
In the civilian workplace, acronyms such as UNODIR (unless otherwise directed) would elicit puzzled expressions from coworkers, but the underlying initiative and solution-oriented approach to problems not only will earn the respect of peers, subordinates, and supervisors, but also are central to individual professional competence. There can be no growth when someone is told what or how to do at all times. The inner strength to learn new skills, rehone old ones, and leverage a team is foundational in any setting.
Recognizing that mastery occurs at an individual pace, but experience accrues at a fixed rate (one day at a time) for all can serve individuals well in or out of uniform, even for those who never served at all.
—Victor Sussman
Why Midshipmen Must Study History
Dr. McCarthy’s piece is compelling. His arguments that “people who do not know the past are lost in the present” and “lost citizens are a danger to themselves and to their fellow citizens” offer a compelling rationale for why everyone, not just midshipmen, should study history.
However, when reading about the “need to know the deeper histories of the cultures and religions that still animate important regions of the world today,” I was taken aback when I saw “Judeo-Christian” on his list.
Certainly, as a Christian, I believe it important to know about the Jewish roots of my religion. However, I have the nagging sense that omitting Judaism, specifically, from that list gives short shrift to a very significant religion that animates the world today—and has done so for millennia.
—CDR Shaun S. Brown, CHC, USN (Ret.)
Repair Time Is the Critical Variable
The Navy was ill-advised to dispose of ships capable of providing repair services to the fleet following the end of the Cold War. Not only were the ships eliminated, but the ratings that populated their repair departments atrophied. Now the Navy has only two repair-type ships in commission, both submarine tenders.
Readers might recall that the USS Vulcan (AR-5) provided immediate repair services to the destroyer Kearny (DD-432) in Iceland, after the Kearny was torpedoed by a German submarine in October 1941. Fast forward to 1987, when the USS Acadia (AD-42) provided repair services to the frigate Stark (FFG-31), in Bahrain, following an Iraqi missile strike on her. The Vulcan and Acadia were in the right place at the right time.
Revitalizing the commercial ship repair industry will, I suspect, be difficult. To grow and retain skilled workers such as welders, pipefitters, etc., shipyards need a reliable stream of work. I submit that the federal government is not a secure source of work for commercial shipyards, as BAE Systems Hawaii demonstrates.
An alternative could be to build new repair-type ships in useful numbers to be forward deployed—or at least put in closer proximity to areas of potential conflict. Such a class may not require the complexity of full-service repair ships. Instead, they could be designed for immediate repairs to ensure the safety of the ship and crew.
—SCPO Paul H. Sayles, USN (Ret.)
A Strategy of Denial for the Western Pacific
A colleague pointed out that, earlier in the American Sea Power Project, Dr. Nicholas Lambert made the case that Alfred Thayer Mahan correctly emphasized commerce protection and protecting or deranging global trade. Mahan looked at the Barbary Wars and how the fledgling Navy protected commerce at sea. In these pages, Dr. Lambert pointed to World War II convoy escort operations as an example. My colleague went on to say that the most salient and important way for the Navy to protect commerce and the U.S. economy for the next decade-plus is to stop China from achieving its hegemonic goals regarding Taiwan and the South and East China Seas. That will require the ability to put China’s navy and invasion forces on the bottom and to strengthen and support allies and partners so they can stand up to China.
Dr. Lambert is thoroughly and constructively Mahanian; Mr. Colby clearly is not.
Peacetime operations are as important as wartime combat inthis construct. The estimable Secretary Bob Work is wrong about forward presence being a deflating distraction, and so is Mr. Colby. Ships performing presence operations do not substitute for effective combat capability as a tripwire. They are the same thing. More to the point, presence missions are the very influence operations Mr. Colby is touting. They need to be global because the competition with China is global. Whether they are done globally will not be lost on either China or our allies.
Further, whole-of-government strategies are as important now and going forward as they ever have been. Shipbuilding and repair—as a place-holder for the panoply of industrial support for naval force structure and resilience—is a national infrastructure issue as essential as bridge building, road repair, and power grid transformation.
Where does this leave the Navy and U.S. navalists? The Navy’s intellectual basis for developing and thinking through these articulations of U.S. naval power is as important as the size and reach of the fleet. Mr. Colby has not added to the effort. “Denial” is inherently defensive and static, no matter how presented, though it would have helped if Mr. Colby had defined it and its imputed difference from whatever the U.S. Navy and the joint force are preparing. Is it deterrence? Is it deferral? Or is it—more usefully—the set of capabilities and combined advantages that would lead to China’s defeat?
The offensive—and cumulative—aspects of American sea power are part of any realistic, overall (i.e., strategic) solution. Regarding Mr. Colby’s argument about horizontal escalation, is he suggesting we pull our punches?
Mr. Colby’s article is incomplete. It neither provides an objective that can be judged against other strategic planning alternatives, nor suggests a useful end state, and it does not add usefully to building out that comprehensive strategic approach.
—CDR Paul S. Giarra, USN (Ret.)