Sea denial. Pentagon magnates should tattoo that simple slogan all over the Replicator initiative, which aims to field uncrewed aerial, surface, and subsurface craft by the thousands and on the cheap over the next few years. This week, Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks is reportedly poised to choose among candidate systems proposed by individual armed services.
Let us posit some standards to help Secretary Hicks and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) make her choice.
The Return of Mass
Replicator’s ostensible goal is to return mass, a core virtue of any fighting force, to the U.S. defense posture in the Indo-Pacific. The logic underwriting the principle of mass is straightforward. The goal of military strategy and operational art is to stage more combat power than an antagonist at the time and place of battle. That implies large numbers of platforms and weapon systems. Now, superior mass is no ironclad guarantee of victory. But the belligerent that musters more combat power at the scene of action biases the contest in its favor.
To be sure, brute mass is not enough in itself. To that end, Hicks has phrased her remarks about Replicator deliberately. “Our goal here is an operational goal,” she says, “and that operational goal is to create dilemmas for China and any other competitor who might look at this approach and try to undermine it.”
Sea denial is the dilemma Replicator should throw at the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) high command. China has premised its strategy on local control of critical seaways such as the Taiwan Strait, East China Sea, and South China Sea. It cannot win without maritime mastery. If an amphibious invasion fleet cannot get across the Taiwan Strait, for example, it cannot land an expeditionary force on the beaches of Taiwan. No expeditionary force means no conquest, and sea denial will have thwarted China’s strategy—even if U.S. and allied forces never win command of the sea for themselves.
Thus, the first standard for Replicator: purpose. Prosecuted with sufficient mass and sufficient skill at arranging forces on the map, a sea-denial strategy—a strategy of the weaker combatant, it bears noting—could be a winning strategy. If a candidate uncrewed aircraft, ship, or submarine contributes directly to barring the PLA from control of key sea expanses, it should make the grade. If not, Hicks should pick a system that does advance the cause of sea denial.
Maritime Command
Time constitutes the second standard. While effective sea denial might confound Chinese aggression in an immediate crisis, U.S. and allied commanders will presumably want to reduce China’s capacity for nautical power projection lest it simply regroup and await auspicious circumstances for a rematch. Intermittent warfare would probably go Beijing’s way over time. To make a victory longer-lasting, joint and allied forces would need to wrest away command of the sea for themselves, disabling or sinking enough of the PLA Navy, China’s maritime militia, and its mercantile fleet to set back future aggression.
Seizing maritime command would take time. It is doubtful that the allies would be the stronger contender on day one of a Pacific war—hence the imperative for sea denial in the opening phase. Chinese forces are concentrated close to home, and U.S. forces are scattered across the globe. To amass enough combat power to vie for command, U.S. military overseers would have to gather forces in the western Pacific, unifying them with forces forward-deployed to the region—all while under fire from China’s antiaccess arsenal.
Bottom line, China will likely triumph in a short, sharp war, but the United States and its allies stand a chance if they can prolong the strife while building up fighting strength. If a candidate for Replicator helps stall the PLA, it is a worthy addition to OSD’s uncrewed roster.
Joint Sea Power
Fortunately, the armed forces have been groping toward a stalling strategy for some time now, albeit in a halting and fragmented way. Under a family of concepts unveiled in recent years, the Marine Corps has reinvented itself as an island-hopping sea-denial force, an adjunct to Navy fleet operations along Asia’s two offshore island chains. Marines armed with sensors and ship killing missiles will flit along the first island chain, denying the PLA access to allied soil while closing the straits that afford access to the western Pacific.
In so doing, the Marine Corps could delay a Chinese victory while gaining precious time for the allies to rouse their strength, go on the offensive, and seize maritime command.
The Army has similarly rediscovered its heritage as a sea service, last on display in a major way during World War II and the Korean War. It is fielding sensors and antiship missiles of its own while developing doctrine, operational concepts, and tactics for operating among Asia’s congested offshore terrain to make things tough on China’s navy and air force. Army leadership has proposed several candidates for Replicator. They should be considered if they promise to help string things out while enfeebling the foe.
The Air Force has undergone a maritime great awakening of its own. Bombers now routinely practice laying precision minefields and delivering antiship munitions. This is an age of joint sea power. Any service able to buttress an active defense against aggression must be part of the operational and strategic mix. In turn, unmanned craft must be part of that mix.
Politics and Strategy
The United States has no strategic position in maritime Asia without alliances. It lies too far from the likely battlegrounds. Trying to defeat China in its own environs while operating from Guam—or from U.S. bases eastward of Guam, or from ships at sea within reach of PLA antiaccess weaponry—would amount to a fool’s game. The tyranny of distance, time, and force would rob U.S. forces of staying power at scenes of battle.
For the most part, then, Replicator will operate from allied territory.
That being the case, it would be worth consulting with allied and friendly capitals now to discern what concerns adding uncrewed platforms to the forward-deployed arsenal might elicit. Allied leaders might fret. Such operations would certainly entrap them in a U.S.-China maelstrom, much as conducting an island-chain strategy would. After all, if U.S. assets were operating from an ally’s ground, it would be reasonable to claim—as Beijing would—that the ally had assented to what Washington intended to do, and thus had joined the fight as a fellow combatant—and exposed itself to military reprisals.
Moreover, U.S. commanders should consider how Replicator fits into allied strategy, operations, and plans. Harmony of effort is just as crucial in multinational as in joint operations, maybe more so. As with sorting out the politics of combined warfare, figuring out how to align unmanned with manned operations across national lines, and to amplify the combat power of allied forces, is of the essence. Systems convivial to interoperability should go to the head of the line.
Sea denial, time, and alliance diplomacy. These are key attributes against which to measure Replicator.