For nearly a century, carriers have defined U.S. naval power projection. Top Gun forever canonized carrier aviation and the term naval aviator is synonymous with precise carrier landings and Kenny Loggins music. However, the earliest naval aircraft did not operate off carriers: they were seaplanes. Throughout World War II, seaplanes rescued downed airmen and sailors, resupplied remote operating bases, supported spy and insurgent networks, and acted as the eyes and ears for commanders in the field. At times, they even filled critical combat roles when land-based aircraft were unavailable. Early in the war, before the availability of secure air bases, they were pivotal to the campaigns in the southern and central Pacific, as well as the Battle of the Atlantic, helping to scout U-boat locations and protect our merchant fleet keeping England alive with supplies.
The Rise and Fall of Naval Seaplanes
During the Japanese invasion of the Philippines in December 1941 and early 1942, U.S. ground forces were routed by Japanese troops and Army Air Forces aircraft were caught on the ground and annihilated by well-coordinated Japanese air strikes. Not tied to the known airfields where the Japanese concentrated their strikes; seaplanes could hide in lagoons, rivers, and bays as the Japanese onslaught ravage allied positions throughout the region. Ninety percent of seaplanes survived the opening days of the war and served as one of the only sources of U.S. aerial logistics and air support to the Philippines during the months following Japanese occupation. They continued to prove their utility throughout the war but met an abrupt end in the Cold War era as the nuclear triad dominated military strategy.
With abundant airbases around the world and absent high-end naval conflict, naval aviation has become accustomed to uncontested long-range logistics, permissive airspace, and free and open seas in which to deploy carriers. The current model for airborne logistics involves long-range routes, with cargo and passengers landed at a sprawling regional base then transferred to rotary-wing or ground convoys for “last mile” delivery. Air drops are an option for insertion in especially challenging areas. However, such tactics are impossible in a Pacific theater where the “last mile” is likely to be more like 500 miles and the destination is a tiny atoll. With the Marine Corps’ new strategy of small disaggregated elements based on atolls and island chains across the vast expanse of the Western pacific, most last mile destinations will lack runways and forward arming and refueling points and be outside the range of rotary-wing platforms.
Further, the Navy has not had to grapple with mass casualty rescue and recovery at sea since 1945. In a potential western Pacific conflict, downed aircrews and crews from sunk vessels will need to be rescued sooner than hours or days. Today, the United States has no capacity to effect a long-range recovery of dozens or hundreds of sailors hundreds of miles from ships or bases.
Operations in support of special operations or intelligence teams will have to be conducted in bays and lagoons far from busy ports and airfields. Insertion, extraction, and resupply of these operators will be an important part of potential future engagements and will not always be feasible with vessels or rotary-wing aircraft. The distances are too great, and complex nighttime linkups can require loitering or lying in wait, something a conventional aircraft cannot do.
Unconventional, Necessary Utility
As a young SEAL officer, I planned a training operation in the western Pacific involving a SEAL delivery vehicle launched well into a contested area. While going over various evasion and recovery scenarios, it became apparent that if there were any heavy resistance or malfunction of our minisub, we would be out of rotary-wing recovery range. The only hope for rescue would be the submarine commander’s willingness to put his boat and crew at risk to rescue a handful of SEALs—not to mention risking regional escalation and geopolitical fallout from having a U.S. guided-missile submarine in contested waters.
In the Pacific theater, U.S. power projection is dangerously dependent on a handful of tactically vulnerable island redoubts: Guam, Saipan, Okinawa, Kwajalein, and Oahu. All could be easily targeted and their infrastructure destroyed in the opening phases of a war, just as in 1941. However, in a potential future war, hypersonic missiles and precision-guided munitions would make the destruction of those bases more efficient and total.
U.S. adversaries are far better prepared for the unique tactical and logistical requirements of a western Pacific confrontation. China is on track to certify the largest seaplane in the world, the AG600 Sea Dragon, while Russia, a long-time seaplane innovator through its amphibious aircraft company Beriev, is still building and fielding the Be-200. Both airframes can carry hundreds of troops, fly thousands of miles, and land in a wide array of sea states. The Be-200 originally was designed as a resupply tender for Soviet submarines.
Japan, the closest U.S. ally in the region, has long understood the value of seaplanes. Having seen the effectiveness of U.S. PBY Catalinas in World War II, it has maintained a small fleet of US-1As and ShinMaywa US-2s, large, four-engine, hull-designed seaplanes, similar to China’s AVIC AG600 Kunlong. Meanwhile, the United States has no amphibious aircraft of any kind. While the Air Force has been touting its attempt to bolt giant floats onto a C130, anyone with even a small amount of seaplane experience can foresee structural, operational, and financial problems. Sources inside the Special Operations aviation community have indicated this program is likely to be terminated soon as alternatives are explored.
Training and Expertise
The expertise required by aircrews and maintenance personnel to operate seaplanes effectively and safely is not acquired easily. Aircrews operating large amphibious aircraft must be not only expert pilots, but also expert boat drivers and mariners; able to read currents, tides, wave height, shorebreak, reef and shoal effects, and low altitude maritime weather. These skills are crafted and developed over years of training and experience, not taught in a four-week course.
In addition, maintenance must sometimes be conducted on an aircraft floating in the water. I once had to do emergency landing gear troubleshooting on a CL-415EAF enhanced aerial fighter on a lake in Nevada. The crew and I landed gear up on the lake and took care of the issue underwater. I never imagined my SEAL training would come in handy with aircraft maintenance! Waterborne aircraft troubleshooting is a unique skill.
Looking Forward
Today, the U.S. defense industrial base is a shadow of its former self. Any attempt to begin production of a new or out of production airframe will face massive challenges. The United States cannot wait until the shooting starts to create the amphibious aviation capability the Sea Services will desperately need in a Pacific war. Thousands of American sailors, soldiers, airmen, and Marines may be floating in life rafts or starving on atolls holding the line as they wait for air support. They deserve to know their nation will come for them. It is up to naval aviation to plug the gap.